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THE TWO INDEXICAL USES THEORY OF PROPER NAMES  







ABSTRACT:  To solve Frege’s puzzle, I develop a novel theory of proper names, the “Two Indexical Uses 
Theory” of proper names (the “TIUT”), according to which proper names are used as indexicals. I distinguish 
two types of indexical uses: (1) ‘Millian’ uses on which a proper name merely refers (contributing its referent 
alone to the proposition expressed); and (2) ‘Conception-indicating’ uses on which a proper name both refers 
and conveys the speaker’s “conception of” or “way of taking” the referent at the moment s/he utters the name 
(contributing both referent and conception to the proposition expressed). Unlike Millianism, the TIUT is 
consistent with speaker intuitions about cognitive value vis-à-vis Frege’s puzzle about identity sentences and is 
consistent with speaker intuitions about truth-value vis-à-vis Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude 
ascriptions. Unlike Descriptivism, the TIUT is not vulnerable to Kripke’s modal, epistemic, or semantic 
arguments because on the TIUT proper names are always used as rigid designators and lack descriptive 
meanings—instead possessing character (the sort of meaning borne by indexicals).  Among theories of proper 
names, the TIUT is uniquely able to explain how co-referential name pairs such as ‘Clark Kent’/‘Superman’ can 
simultaneously have the following three properties: (a) rigidity, (b) lack of descriptive meaning, and (c) 
difference in semantic content.   The TIUT explains the difference in cognitive value between identity sentences 
such as ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ by demonstrating that they may be used to 
semantically express different propositions with identical modal profiles (unlike Descriptivism, according to 
which they would have different modal profiles). The TIUT explains the difference in truth-value intuited by 
ordinary speakers between propositional attitude ascriptions such as ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies’ 
and ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman flies’ by demonstrating that they may be used to semantically express 
different propositions genuinely differing in truth-value, the former false and the latter true. The TIUT also 
solves Kripke’s puzzle by explaining how a rational and reflective agent might simultaneously believe P and ⌐P 
and why one may accurately and without inconsistency ascribe the belief both that P and that ⌐P to that agent. 
Hence, we may accurately and without inconsistency report Peter as both believing that Paderewski had musical 
talent and believing that he did not.    
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The theory of proper names presented here, the Two Indexical Uses Theory of proper names or 
“TIUT,” is, to my knowledge, sui generis.  The central claim is that proper names are used as 
indexicals.  I distinguish two types of indexical uses: (1) ‘Millian’ uses on which a name merely refers 
(contributing its bearer/referent alone to the proposition expressed); and (2) ‘Conception-indicating’ 
uses on which a name both refers and conveys the speaker’s “conception of” or “way of taking” the 
bearer/referent at the moment s/he utters the name (contributing both referent and conception to the 
proposition expressed).   
The TIUT is designed specifically to solve Frege’s puzzle, as well as other semantic puzzles 
such as the puzzle I call the ‘Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief’ (see section 1.2, infra) and a 
related puzzle, Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle.  I aim to show that the TIUT is the best theory of proper 
names because it offers the most comprehensive solution to this set of puzzles. It avoids the problems 
bedeviling other theories of proper names that pretend to solve the puzzles.  On the one hand, we have 
Descriptivism, which was largely refuted by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity.  Kripke famously 
argued that Descriptivism was defective because, inter alia, it held proper names to have descriptive 
meanings and to be non-rigid designators.  The TIUT, in full agreement with Kripke and the current 
philosophical consensus, maintains that proper names are devoid of descriptive meaning (as indexicals, 
their meaning is their character) and are always rigid designators.  On the other hand, we have 
Millianism, which makes numerous highly counterintuitive claims.  For example, Millians dubiously 
maintain that the true sentence ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ semantically 
expresses the same proposition as the sentence ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman,’ and 




also implausibly claim that the sentences ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ 
semantically express the same proposition—the trivial proposition that a particular individual is 
identical to himself.  The TIUT avoids the absurd implications of Millianism, and, consistent with 
common sense, maintains that these sentences semantically express different propositions.  
The TIUT answers the central question posed by Frege’s puzzle: how can co-referential 
proper names such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ simultaneously be all of the following: (a) 
rigid, (b) lacking descriptive meaning, and (c) different in semantic content?    
Unlike some other anti-Millian theories of proper names, the TIUT recognizes that Millianism 
gets a lot right, even if it cannot be a fully correct theory of proper names because it cannot solve the 
puzzles.  Most of the time proper names are used just as Millians say—just to refer to their bearers and 
nothing else.  This is so in the case of names occurring in ordinary simple sentences, identity 
sentences, and within the ‘that’-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions.  A good theory of proper 
names must take into account the plausibility of the Millian picture vis-à-vis the majority of uses of 
proper names.  However, the failure of Millians to offer plausible solutions to Frege’s puzzle and other 
semantic puzzles militates in favor of the judgment that proper names must be used in non-Millian 
ways in some cases.  The proper conclusion to draw is that names can be used in at least two ways—a 
Millian way, where a name just refers to its bearer, and a non-Millian way where the speaker uses a 
name to refer to its bearer and also to indicate a conception of or way of taking that bearer.  In short, I 
am proposing that names are semantically ambiguous between these two kinds of uses: a ‘Millian’ use 
and a ‘Conception-indicating’ use.    
I am positing a semantic distinction and not a pragmatic one. Some philosophers will object 
that I am going too far in positing a semantic distinction—perhaps agreeing with my claim that proper 




differences in use mark a semantic distinction.  However, I do really do want to posit a semantic 
distinction.  For there is, as far as I can see, no pragmatic mechanism—neither implicature, descriptive 
enrichment, nor any other pragmatic mechanism—that could explain the fundamentally different ways 
in which proper names are regularly and consistently used.   Unfortunately, there is a dogma in the 
current philosophy of language according to which the positing of a semantic distinction is viewed as 
something close to a mortal sin.  Wherever possible, according to this dogma, one is to explain away 
the appearance of a semantic distinction by appealing to pragmatics. However, I think this dogma is 
too extreme, and some philosophers have recently attacked this dogma with some measure of success.  
For example, Devitt (2004) and Reimer (1998) argue persuasively that the distinction between 
attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions is a semantic distinction (and not merely a 
pragmatic difference in use).  They employ an argument that has come to be called “the argument from 
convention,” according to which the fact that a certain expression is used regularly (i.e., with high 
frequency) and without “special stage setting” (Devitt 2004, p. 283) to convey some content C, 
constitutes solid evidence that the expression conventionally (i.e., semantically) means C.  Hence, the 
fact that definite descriptions are regularly used without special stage setting—sometimes attributively 
and sometimes referentially—is solid evidence that the referential/attributive distinction is semantic, 
and not pragmatic, in nature. With respect to proper names and the distinction between Millian and 
Conception-indicating uses that I propose here, I urge that the argument from convention militates in 
favor of finding a semantic distinction.  The existence of two regular uses of proper names without 
special stage setting—sometimes just to contribute a name’s bearer/referent to the proposition 
expressed, and sometimes to contribute both the bearer/referent and a conception of it—is solid 
evidence that we are faced with a genuine semantic distinction.  Proper names are semantically 




only by looking to the speaker’s expressive intent. (I am not suggesting, of course, that we have to be 
mind readers in order to figure out a speaker’s expressive intent in order to resolve ambiguities. 
Utterance interpretation generally proceeds via contextual clues, which are a highly reliable guide to 
the expressive intent of the speaker.)   
Even if the reader of this paper should not be convinced that the distinction I wish to draw is 
semantic in nature, I hope that s/he will nevertheless find the TIUT an interesting and useful 
examination of proper names in so far as it aptly characterizes the various ways in which proper names 
may be used, accurately sets out the truth conditions of proper name-containing sentences, and offers a 





THE PUZZLES TO BE SOLVED 
 
1.1 Frege’s Puzzle 
 
The philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege first described the eponymous “Frege’s 
puzzle” in his seminal 1892 paper On Sense and Reference.  There are two versions of the puzzle: the 
puzzle about identity sentences and the puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions. 
First, let us briefly examine the puzzle about identity sentences.  Treat the Superman story as 
non-fictional and consider the following identity sentences, (1) and (2), which differ in one respect 
only: one co-referential name has been substituted for another.   
  
(1)  Clark Kent is Clark Kent 
  
(2)  Clark Kent is Superman 
  
  
In (2) ‘Superman’ is substituted for the second occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ in (1).  Consider now the 
simplest theory of proper names—a theory attributed to the nineteenth-century English philosopher 
John Stuart Mill and called “Millianism” in his honor: a proper name always and invariably contributes 
its referent/bearer only and nothing more to the proposition expressed by a sentence in which it occurs.  
Frege showed that Millianism is false by the following sort of reductio.  Suppose that Millianism were 
true.  ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would each contribute their common bearer/referent—to which I’ll 
refer throughout this paper as ‘Kent-Super’—to the propositions expressed by sentences (1) and (2) in 
which they occur.  Sentences (1) and (2) would both express the singular proposition that Kent-Super 
is Kent-Super. This proposition may be schematized as PROP-1. 
 
PROP-1  << Kent-Super, Kent-Super >, identity >> 
 




(2) is informative to Lois Lane, who does not realize that Clark Kent is the same person as Superman, 
whereas sentence (1) is not.  She might learn something from (2) but not from (1). A rational agent 
might doubt that (2) is true but not that (1) is. (However, see this footnote 1 for an important 
qualification). Frege summed up these salient differences between sentences such as (1) and (2) by 
saying that they differ in Erkenntiswert or ‘cognitive value.’  It would be difficult to explain the 
difference in cognitive value between (1) and (2) if they expressed the same proposition (as Millians 
maintain).  The simplest and best explanation for the cognitive value difference is that they express 
different propositions.  Hence, they must express different propositions and therefore Millianism must 
be false. 
So here is the puzzle: if Millianism is false, what then is the correct theory of proper names? 
That is to say, just what are the (different) contributions of the proper names ‘Clark Kent’ and 
‘Superman’ to the propositions expressed by sentences (1) and (2) such that we may explain why these 
sentences differ in cognitive value?   
Now let us briefly examine the puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions. Frege noticed 
that the substitution of one co-referential name in place of another inside the ‘that’-clause of a 
propositional attitude ascription sentence could change its truth-value, rather than its cognitive value. 
Consider propositional attitude ascription sentences (3) and (4). 
  
(3)  Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent 
                                                 
1 Sentence (1) not subject to rational doubt as long as it is uttered to express the trivial proposition that Clark Kent is 
identical to himself.  As I touch upon in section 2.1 and discuss at further length in section 2.9, it is not strictly speaking 
true to say that natural language sentences of the syntactic form a=a, such as sentence (1), are always uninformative 
identities, expressing trivial propositions about self-identity whose truth-value can be ascertained by any rational agent 
merely by inspecting the syntactic form of the sentence. In fact, sentence (1) could be uttered as an informative identity. For 
example, a man—call him ‘Tom’—might utter (1) to himself to express his belief that the Clark Kent he meets at a party is 
the same Clark Kent he went to Kindergarten with in Smallville. In such a case, a rational agent could very well wonder 
whether Tom expressed a true proposition in uttering (1) and could not tell whether (1), as uttered by Tom, is true or false 
merely by considering its syntactic form. Or, for example, consider Kripke’s Paderewski case. A man named ‘Peter’ might 
say ‘Paderewski the pianist has musical talent, but Paderewski the politician surely does not,’ failing to realize that the 
pianist and the politician are the same person. Someone might utter ‘But Peter, Paderewski is Paderewski’ to Peter in an 
attempt to convince him that Paderewski the politician is the same person as Paderewski the musician. No one can tell 
whether the sentence ‘… Paderewski is Paderewski’ is used here to express a true or false proposition just by considering 




(4)  Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman 
  
In (4) ‘Superman’ is substituted for the second occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ in (3), inside the ‘that’-
clause.  According to the intuitions of ordinary speakers, sentence (3) is true and sentence (4) is false. 
Sentence (3) is true because Lois Lane is acquainted with Clark Kent and, being a rational person, she 
realizes that he is identical to himself. Sentence (4) is false because, according to the Superman story, 
Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is the same person as Superman and the negation of (4), 
either sentence ¬ (4) or (4n), could be truthfully uttered to express the state of her ignorance. 
  
       ¬ (4)  Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman 
 (4n)  Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman2 
  
Differences in truth-value resulting from substitution may also occur where the ‘that’-clause is not an 
identity statement.  For example, ordinary speakers judge (5) to be false and (6) to be true. 
  
(5)  Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies 
(6)  Lois Lane believes that Superman flies   
  
However, Millianism entails that the intuitions of ordinary speakers about the truth-value of sentence 
pairs (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) are erroneous.  According to Millianism, (3) and (4) both express the 
proposition that Lois Lane believes PROP-1, i.e., the proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super.  Since 
                                                 
2 Note the distinction between ¬ (4) and (4n).  These sentences do not express the same proposition, even if ordinary 
speakers do not typically carefully distinguish between them.  Not believing a proposition (failing to believe a proposition) 
is not the same thing as disbelieving a proposition. If I have neither looked outside my window nor heard the weather report 
and I am rational, I neither believe nor disbelieve that it is raining outside. I suspend judgment.  In such a case, it would be 
correct to report me as “not believing it is raining outside,” for I lack the belief that it is raining outside. I also lack the 
belief that it is not raining out.  On the other hand, if I look out of my window and I see it is bright and sunny, I would not 
suspend judgment. I would disbelieve that it is raining outside. We may not presume pre-theoretically that ¬ (4) and (4n) 
express the same proposition. We should distinguish between them, even if they are often used synonymously in ordinary 
speech.  ¬ (4) and (4n) are both true because Lois Lane lacks the belief that Clark Kent is Superman, and she also 
disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman because she is actively disposed to scoff and/or laugh at the suggestion, were 
anyone to make it, that Clark Kent is Superman. 




Lois believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super,3 (3) and (4) are both true.  Contrary to our intuition about 
the matter, Millianism has it that (4) is true and therefore Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is 
Superman.  According to Millianism, (5) and (6) both express the proposition that Lois Lane believes 
that Kent-Super flies.  Since Lois believes that proposition,4 (5) and (6) are both true.  Contrary to our 
intuition about the matter, Millianism has it that (5) is true and Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent 
flies. We should reject Millianism because the simplest and best explanation for our intuition that there 
are truth-value differences is the supposition that our intuition is correct and the members of these 
sentence pairs express different propositions with different truth-values. 
If Millianism is false as the two reductio arguments above strongly suggest, we have to propose 
an alternate theory of proper names.  Frege’s puzzle asks: what does a proper name contribute to the 
proposition expressed by a sentence in which it occurs such that we may explain the cognitive and 
truth-value differences illustrated above?  To solve the puzzle, we require a theory of proper names 
according to which co-referential names such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ may have different 
contents and make different semantic contributions to the propositions expressed by sentence pairs (1)-
(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6), such that the members of these sentence pairs express different propositions. 
In his 1892 paper On Sense and Reference, Frege thought he could solve the problem he had 
raised for Millianism.  He denied the Millian thesis that a proper name contributes its bearer/referent to 
the proposition. In very rough sketch, Frege proposed instead that a proper name contributes its Sinn or 
“sense” to the proposition.5   Frege was not entirely clear about what senses are. Most philosophers 
                                                 
3 She believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super both when she conceives him as Superman and when she conceives him as 
Clark Kent. She would assent to both ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman is Superman.’  
 
4 She believes that Kent-Super flies when she conceives him as Superman. According to Millianism, (5) is true because it 
expresses the proposition that Lois believes that Kent-Super flies, full stop, without respect to how she conceives Kent-
Super when she judges that he flies.   
 
5 According to Frege, the sense of a whole sentence, which Frege calls a Gedanke or “thought” (in modern parlance, a 
“Fregean proposition”), is composed of the senses of the words occurring in it.  Proper names, as well as concept-words, 





have interpreted a sense to be a condition that an individual or object uniquely satisfies, a condition 
that might be given by a definite description (or collection of definite descriptions). The referent of a 
proper name would be the object or individual uniquely denoted by said definite description (or 
collection thereof).6   For example, the sense of the name ‘Clark Kent’ might be given by the definite 
description the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet. The sense of the 
name ‘Superman’ might be given by the definite description the caped superhero that protects 
Metropolis.  The names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would co-refer because these definite 
descriptions denote the same individual.7  Identity sentence (1) would be uninformative because it 
would express the trivial and obviously true proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from 
Smallville working for the Daily Planet is the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the 
Daily Planet.  Identity sentence (2) would be informative because it would express the non-trivial and 
non-obviously true proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily 
Planet is the caped superhero that protects Metropolis.8  Bertrand Russell (1905) proposed a 
                                                 
6
 In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Meaning (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/#FrePro), Jeff 
Speaks explains why it is reasonable to interpret Frege as intending senses to be given by definite descriptions or clusters 
thereof:  
 
Here is one initially plausible way of explaining what the sense of a name is. We know that, whatever the content 
of a name is, it must be something that determines as a reference the object for which the name stands; and we 
know that, if Fregeanism is true, this must be something other than the object itself. A natural thought, then, is that 
the content of a name—its sense—is some condition that the referent of the name uniquely satisfies. Co-referential 
names can differ in sense because there is always more than one condition that a given object uniquely satisfies. 
(For example, Superman/Clark Kent uniquely satisfies both the condition of being the superhero Lois most 
admires, and the newspaperman she least admires.) Given this view, it is natural to then hold that names have the 
same meanings as definite descriptions—phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so.’ After all, phrases of this sort seem to 
be designed to pick out the unique object, if any, which satisfies the condition following the ‘the.’  
 
7 But note that in propositional attitude contexts, the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would not co-refer, according to 
Frege. In propositional attitude contexts proper names would refer to their senses, rather than their usual referent, Kent-
Super.  So ‘Clark Kent’ would refer to the sense of ‘Clark Kent’ instead of referring to Kent-Super, and ‘Superman’ would 
refer to the sense of ‘Superman’ instead of referring to Kent-Super.  
 
8
 The received view is that Frege was a Descriptivist and that he would have endorsed this sort of solution to the puzzle 
about identity sentences. However, some philosophers have argued that Frege was not in fact a Descriptivist. See, e.g., 
Burge, T. Sinning Against Frege, in Philosophical Review 88, 1979, pp. 398-432.  I recognize that Frege’s views are 
subject to various interpretations. The genuine nature of Frege’s views is however orthogonal to the purposes of this paper 





superficially similar theory according to which proper names abbreviate definite descriptions.  Despite 
important differences between Frege and Russell’s theories, both are often referred to as the Frege-
Russell theory of proper names (Kripke, 1980) or as “Descriptivism,” because both views propose that 
the meaning of a proper name may be given by a definite description or collection thereof. 
In his seminal work Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke presented powerful arguments 
against Descriptivism that thoroughly undermined it in the view of most philosophers. After Naming 
and Necessity, Descriptivism would have few defenders.  Kripke established at least two important 
widely accepted theses about proper names.  First, he showed that proper names are rigid designators.  
Thus, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ refer to the same individual, Kent-Super, in the actual world and in 
every possible world.9 This entails that the proposition expressed by sentence (1) has the same modal 
profile as the proposition expressed by sentence (2).10  Problematically for Descriptivism, according to 
most versions of it proper names are not rigid designators and (1) and (2) would express propositions 
with different modal profiles.11  Second, Kripke made a strong case for the proposition that proper 
names are not synonymous with definite descriptions or collections thereof.  So even if a large 
percentage of a language community were to associate the name ‘Superman’ with the definite 
                                                 
9 I write about proper names here as if they were obstinately rigid designators, as opposed to persistently rigid designators, 
although I do not believe that the arguments I make in this paper ride on which notion of rigidity is correct. A designator is 
obstinately rigid if it designates the same object in every possible world, even in those worlds in which that object does not 
exist. By contrast, an expression is persistently rigid if it designates the same object in every possible world in which that 
object exists and designates nothing in those worlds in which that that object does not exist. The distinction was expressly 
drawn by Salmon (1981). Kripke alternates between these two conceptions of rigidity in his writings, although more often 
than not he gives the impression that he favors persistent rigidity. Many philosophers have argued that the notion of 
obstinate rigidity is the correct one. See, e.g., Branquinho, João. 2003. “In Defense of Obstinacy.” Nous-Supplement: Phil. 
Perspectives 17: 1-23.   
 
10 Meaning that the propositions expressed have the same truth-value in every possible world.   
 
11
 “Rigidified Descriptivism” proposes that the associated definite descriptions are to be understood as rigidified with the 
actually or dthat operator so that the name ‘Superman’ would mean, e.g., the actual super hero that protects Metropolis 
and the name ‘Clark Kent’ would mean the actual mild-mannered reporter from Smallville who works for the Daily Planet.  
On this account, the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would differ in content and would indeed be rigid designators.  
Sentences (1) and (2) would express propositions with the same modal profile.  However, rigidified descriptivism is 






description the superhero that protects Metropolis, the name ‘Superman’ would not be synonymous 
with that definite description. In short, Kripke persuasively argued that proper names are devoid of 
descriptive meaning.  In this paper, I presuppose that these Kripkean theses—that proper names are 
rigid designators and devoid of descriptive meaning—are correct.   
Subsequent to Naming and Necessity and the widespread rejection of Descriptivism, many 
philosophers revived Millianism, developing modern versions of it aiming to explain away or assuage 
its counterintuitive implications.  I do not examine these modern Millian theories in this paper.12  I 
think that Millianism is false and the revival of Millianism represented an overreaction to Kripke’s 
arguments.  Many philosophers jumped to the conclusion that because Kripke showed that proper 
names were devoid of descriptive meaning, they must therefore be devoid of all meaning.  They must 
be meaningless “tags” (Barcan Marcus, 1961) or labels that speakers use merely to refer to objects and 
individuals.  I shall argue in this paper that proper names do in fact have meanings.  They are not 
descriptive meanings but rather character, the sort of meanings borne by indexicals.13   
Although Kripke showed that proper names do not have descriptive meanings, at the same time 
we must recognize that speakers do frequently associate descriptive properties with proper names.  For 
example, most of us associate different properties with the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’  When 
we utter ‘Clark Kent,’ we are typically thinking about Kent-Super under a mild-mannered reporter 
conception, and when we utter ‘Superman’ we are typically thinking about Kent-Super under a strong 
superhero conception.  Although these conceptions do not constitute the meanings of the proper names 
‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman,’ nevertheless it is clear that speakers sometimes use these proper names 
to convey conceptions to their audience.  Speakers would typically utter sentence (2)  
 
(2) Clark Kent is Superman  
                                                 
12 A slim majority of philosophers today are Millians or sympathetic towards it.  
 





to pick out two conceptions of Kent-Super—a ‘Clark Kent-y’ mild-mannered reporter conception and 
a ‘Superman-y’ strong superhero conception—and say that both conceptions relate to the same 
individual, Kent-Super.   
Speakers would typically utter sentence ¬ (4)  
 
         ¬ (4)  Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman 
 
to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super thought of under a Clark Kent-y conception is the 
same person as Kent-Super thought of under a Superman-y conception.  Speakers would utter ¬ (5) 
 
         ¬ (5) Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent flies 
 
to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super flies when she thinks of him under a Clark Kent-y 
conception.  In these cases, proper names are used both to refer to an individual and to convey a 
conception of that individual.  This flies directly in the face of the Millian claim that the sole function 
of proper names is to refer.  
At the same time, proper names are sometimes (indeed, probably most of the time) used as 
Millians claim—just to contribute their referents and nothing further.  Speakers mainly use names 
simply to call their audience’s attention to the right individual or object and say something about it.  
They communicate conceptions only under the circumstances in which there are two (or more) salient 
conceptions of an object or individual in a conversational context and the speaker desires to distinguish 
between them, as in the Frege’s puzzle cases illustrated above (involving Lois Lane, Clark Kent and 
Superman). See section 2.1, infra, for further discussion of my claim that names may be employed in 
these two sorts of ways: to refer and convey conceptions; and to refer and nothing else.  
In light of the foregoing considerations, to solve Frege’s puzzle I propose that we need a theory 





1. Proper names are rigid designators [From Kripke’s modal argument].14 
2.  Proper names do not have descriptive meanings [From Kripke’s modal, semantic, and 
epistemic arguments]. 
  
3.    Identity sentences like (1)-(2) express different propositions with the same modal profile 
[That they have the same modal profile follows from Kripke’s modal argument and the 
thesis that names are rigid designators; that they express different propositions follows 
from intuitions about cognitive value differences brought to light by Frege’s puzzle 
about identity sentences].  
  
4.    Propositional attitude ascriptions like (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) express different propositions 
differing in truth-value [From intuitions about truth-value differences brought to light by 
Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions]. 
  
5.  Sometimes proper names are used merely to refer, contributing only their referents to 
the propositions expressed. 
 
6.   Sometimes proper names are used both to refer and to convey conceptions. They 
contribute something other than merely their referents to the propositions expressed. 
  
 
In this paper, I shall elaborate how the TIUT solves Frege’s puzzle while respecting theses 1-6, supra.  
The TIUT claims proper names have two uses, each of which is indexical in nature.  When a speaker 
uses a name in a ‘Millian’ way, its content and its contribution to the proposition expressed by the 
sentence in which it occurs is its bearer/referent alone. When a speaker uses a name in a ‘Conception-
indicating’ way, the name contributes both its bearer/referent and a conception of it to the proposition 
expressed.  Proper names are always rigid designators whether used in a Millian or Conception-
indicating way and are devoid of descriptive meaning—they have instead character, the sort of 
meaning borne by indexicals.  Hence, the TIUT is not a Descriptivist theory of proper names and is not 
vulnerable to the arguments Kripke marshaled against Descriptivism in Naming and Necessity.  
 As I alluded to in footnote 1 supra, there is a minor flaw in the way that Frege stated the puzzle 
about identity sentence in Sense and Reference.  Frege assumed incorrectly that natural language 
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 I leave open the possibility that there may be some uses of proper names that are not rigid. But I presuppose that all of 




identity sentences of the form a=a, such as (1) (‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’), were always 
uninformative and one could tell that they were true just by inspection of their syntactic form, whereas 
sentences of the form a=b, such as (2) (‘Clark Kent is Superman’), were informative and one could not 
tell whether they were true or false merely by inspection of their syntactic form.  However, the 
dichotomy is false. In fact, natural language sentences of the form a=a can be either informative or 
uninformative.  For example, (as already discussed above), a man—call him ‘Tom’—might meet Clark 
Kent, the reporter for the Daily Planet, at a party and suspect that he is the same Clark Kent he went to 
Kindergarten with in Smallville.  Tom might utter sentence (1) (‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’) to himself 
to express his belief that the Clark Kent from the party is the Clark Kent with whom he attended 
Kindergarten in Smallville. In such a case, a rational agent hearing Tom uttering this sentence could 
very well wonder whether Tom expressed a true proposition.  Tom himself might harbor some doubts 
about whether what he said is true.  Here, one cannot tell that (1) is true based merely on the fact that 
the same syntactic string ‘Clark Kent’ appears on both the left and right sides of the ‘is.’ 15  The TIUT 
explains why sentence (1) could express either an informative or an uninformative identity.  Whether 
an uninformative or informative identity is expressed will depend on whether the speaker uses the 
names in a Millian or Conception-indicating way. If both names are used in a Millian way in (1), then 
a trivial and uninformative identity is expressed. Each occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ has the same 
semantic content, Kent-Super, and the sentence therefore expresses the proposition that Kent-Super is 
identical to himself.16  However, if each occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ in (1) is used in a Conception-
indicating way and the speaker attaches a different conception to each tokening (each tokening 
                                                 
15 Or consider Kripke’s Paderewski case: a man named Peter might not realize that Paderewski, a famous Polish politician, 
is Paderewski the famous Polish pianist, believing that Politicians rarely have musical talent. Peter might utter: ‘Paderewski 
the pianist had real musical talent, but not Paderewski the politician.’ One might say to Peter ‘But Peter, Paderewski is 
Paderewski’ to inform him that Paderewski the politician is the same person as Paderewski the pianist. Here, one cannot tell 
whether the sentence ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’ expresses a true proposition just by inspecting its syntactic form.  
 
16 And even if Tom used the names in a Conception-indicating way, sentence (1) would express an uninformative identity 
as long as Tom intended each occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ to pick out the very same conception of Kent-Super, instead of 




therefore having a different semantic content), an informative identity is expressed and its truth-value 
cannot be discerned based on syntactic form.  
The TIUT offers an attractive solution to Frege’s puzzle because it respects speaker intuitions 
about cognitive value and truth-value.  It shows how co-referential names such as ‘Clark Kent’ and 
‘Superman’ can be rigid, as well as devoid of descriptive meaning, and yet differ in semantic content—
something I believe no other extant theory of proper names does.17  It navigates the waters between 
Descriptivism and Millianism, retaining their plausible parts while avoiding the implausible aspects 
each presents.  It explains the difference in cognitive value between sentences (1) and (2) by 
demonstrating that they express different propositions with the same modal profile (by contrast with 
most versions of Descriptivism,18 according to which (1) and (2) would express different propositions 
with different modal profiles).  It explains our powerful intuition of a difference in truth-value between 
propositional attitude ascriptions sentences (3) and (4), and between (5) and (6), by demonstrating that 
they express different propositions genuinely differing in truth-value (by contrast with Millianism, 
which counterintuitively claims that the apparent difference in truth-value is erroneous and these 
ascription sentence pairs express the same proposition with the same truth-value).  The TIUT also 
offers an attractive solution to Kripke’s Puzzle (Kripke, 1979) (see section 2.12, infra) explaining how 
and why a rational and reflective agent might simultaneously believe P and ⌐P (e.g., the rational and 
reflective Lois Lane both believes and disbelieves the singular proposition that Kent-Super can fly)19 
and why an ascriber may accurately and consistently ascribe the belief both that P and that ⌐P to that 
agent. (See section 1.2, infra, discussing the related “Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief”).  
                                                 
17 With the possible exception of “rigidified descriptivism.” See footnote 11, supra, for definition of rigidified 
descriptivism. Rigidified Descriptivism deals nicely with Kripke’s objections to Descriptivism in his modal argument, but 
cannot handle the worries Kripke raised in his epistemic and semantic arguments. Unlike rigidified descriptivism, the TIUT 
is not vulnerable to any of the arguments Kripke marshaled against Descriptivism in Naming and Necessity.   
 
18 On “Rigidified Descriptivism” proper names are rigid designators. 
  
19 She believes the proposition when she conceives of Kent-Super under a Superman-y conception, and disbelieves it when 





1.2 The Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief 
The ‘Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief’ challenges us to explain how an agent’s 
expressing and believing inconsistent propositions can be compatible with his or her rationality. 
Ordinarily, we would say that believing inconsistent propositions is incompatible with an agent’s 
rationality.  For example, if an agent were to claim (and not in jest) that it is raining outside now and 
that it is not raining outside now, we would judge that agent irrational.20  However, according to both 
the TIUT and Millianism, Lois Lane, who we may presume is a rational and reflective agent, believes 
many inconsistent singular propositions.  For example, suppose someone asked her to name a non-
avian flying being and in response she uttered sentence (8).  
 
(8) Superman flies 
 
According to the TIUT, she would use the name ‘Superman’ in a Millian way here—just to refer to 
Kent-Super.  She would not use the name ‘Superman’ in a Conception-indicating way to make her 
Superman-y way of conceiving him salient and contrast this with her Clark Kent-y way of conceiving 
him because she has no idea that these are different conceptions of the very same individual and she is 
not drawing any contrast.  See section 2.1 infra, for further discussion of this point.  Likewise, if 
someone asked Lois to name a non-avian being incapable of flight, she might utter ¬ (7) in response. 
 
¬ (7) Clark Kent does not fly 
 
Again, she would use ‘Clark Kent’ in a Millian way—just to refer to Kent-Super. Since the names 
‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are used in both (8) and ¬ (7) in a Millian way, they contribute the same 
thing to the proposition expressed, to wit, their common referent, Kent-Super, and nothing more.  
Hence, sentence (8), as uttered by Lois, would express the singular proposition that Kent-Super flies, 
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 Assume that the agent means that it is both raining and not raining in the same place at the same time in the same way. 




and sentence ¬ (7) would express the singular proposition that Kent-Super does not fly.  In uttering (8) 
and ¬ (7), Lois Lane would contradict herself.  Assuming that Lois believes the propositions expressed 
by sentence (8) and ¬ (7)—sentences which she understands and accepts—then she believes 
inconsistent propositions.21  She simultaneously believes a proposition and its negation.  How do we 
square Lois believing inconsistent propositions with her being rational? 
To solve the problem, we will have to claim that Lois has these inconsistent beliefs because of 
ignorance, not irrationality.  There is something she fails to realize, and this explains her expression of, 
and belief in, the inconsistent propositions expressed by (8) and ¬ (7).  She is rational despite believing 
inconsistent propositions.  She has what I shall call ‘rationally inconsistent beliefs.’  A theory of proper 
names must be able to solve the problem of rational inconsistent belief by specifying what Lois Lane 
fails to realize—what she is ignorant of vis-à-vis the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. And it begs 
the question to say merely that Lois “fails to realize that Clark Kent is Superman” unless one specifies 
what failing to realize that Clark Kent is Superman consists in.  Once it is clear exactly what Lois fails 
to realize, and why, the charge of irrationality will not stick: her inconsistency can be explained by this 
ignorance rather than irrationality.  The TIUT solves the problem of rational inconsistent belief (see 
section 2.8, infra) by showing what Lois Lane fails to realize, and why, and is therefore shows that her 
inconsistent beliefs are due to this ignorance rather than irrationality.    
 Millians must address the problem of rational inconsistent belief as well, but I shall argue that 
they cannot solve the problem.  Unlike the TIUT, which claims (in accord with common-sense 
intuitions) that propositional attitude ascriptions (3) and (4) express different propositions, Millians 
posit that they express the same proposition.  Therefore, Millians must claim that an enlightened 
                                                 
21 That Lois Lane believes the propositions expressed by sentences ⌐ (7) and (8) follows from the “weak disquotation 
principle” (Kripke, 1979), which says: if a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker s who understands a sentence 





speaker (i.e., a speaker who knows that Clark Kent is Superman) such as Jimmy Olson22 would 
contradict himself if he uttered the seemingly true propositional attitude ascriptions (3) and (4n).  
 
(3) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent 
        (4n) Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman 
 
According to Millianism, (3) and (4n) would express inconsistent propositions—the respective 
propositions that Lois believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super and that Lois fails to believe that Kent-
Super is Kent-Super.  That is, in uttering (3) and (4n), Olson would express the proposition that it is the 
case that Lois Lane believes Kent-Super is Kent-Super and that it is not the case that she believes that 
Kent-Super is Kent-Super.  Olson would contradict himself and express inconsistent propositions in 
uttering (3) and (4n).  The problem of rational inconsistent belief is hence a deeper problem for 
Millianism than for the TIUT, since Millians have to explain why both rational unenlightened and 
enlightened speakers contradict themselves. For the TIUT the problem is limited only to unenlightened 
speakers such as Lois Lane who do not realize that Clark Kent is Superman.   
I do not think that the problem of rational inconsistent belief could be solved for enlightened 
speakers, were it to be the case that enlightened speakers such as Olson really contradicted themselves 
in uttering (3) and (4n) as Millians claim.  The unenlightened Lois Lane is ignorant of the identity of 
Clark Kent and Superman, and this ignorance (whatever it may consist in), rather than irrationality, 
explains why she has inconsistent beliefs with respect to Kent-Super, such as both believing and 
disbelieving that he flies.  By contrast, the enlightened Jimmy Olson fully realizes that Clark Kent is 
Superman and he is fully informed about Lois’ confused and erroneous beliefs about the identity. 
Olson is not ignorant of any facts whatsoever about Kent-Super or about Lois Lane that would explain 
why he makes (allegedly) inconsistent statements when he when he utters (3) and (4n), leaving 
                                                 
22 Presume throughout the paper that Jimmy Olson is aware of the identity of Clark Kent and Superman, i.e., he is 




irrationality as the only possible explanation.  But Olson is not irrational.  Any rational enlightened 
speaker (perhaps even a die-hard Millian philosopher in his or her moments of inattention to his or her 
philosophical commitments) would unhesitatingly utter (3) and (4n) to ascribe beliefs to Lois. So we 
are left with no plausible explanation of Olson’s inconsistency—neither ignorance nor irrationality 
explains it. This casts doubt on the Millian claim that that (3) and (4n) express inconsistent 
propositions (and, by implication, that (3) and (4) express the same proposition), and thereby 





























                                                 
23 For a Millian response to a similar point made by Stephen Schiffer, see Salmon (2006). On Salmon’s view, the 
enlightened Olson contradicts himself for a very different sort of reason than the unenlightened Lois does. Olson is ignorant 
about the correct semantic theory of proper names (which Salmon takes to be Millianism), while Lois is ignorant about 
ordinary, non-theoretical facts. Because of Olson’s ignorance of the (supposed) truth of Millianism, he erroneously takes 
(3) and (4) to express different propositions and therefore he does not realize that he contradicts himself when uttering (3) 






THE TWO INDEXICALS THEORY OF PROPER NAMES  
AND ITS SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLES 
 
According to the TIUT, proper names have two uses.  When a proper name is used in a ‘Millian 
way’ it merely contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it occurs.  
When a proper name is used in a ‘Conception-indicating’ way, it contributes its referent as well as a 
conception of it to the proposition.  Names are rigid designators and function as indexicals whether 
they are used in a Millian or a Conception-indicating way.  I discuss the reasons for supposing that 
names have these two uses in section 2.1, below.  In section 2.2, I introduce several key terms of art I 
use to characterize the character and content of proper names on their two uses, which I set out in 
sections 2.3 (Millian uses) and 2.4 (Conception-indicating uses).  In the sections thereafter, I show how 
the TIUT solves the puzzles, including Frege’s puzzle (both versions), the Problem of Rational 
Inconsistent Belief, and Kripke’s Paderewski Puzzle.   
 
2.1 The Two Uses of Proper Names 
Frege’s puzzles—both the puzzle about identity sentences and the puzzle about propositional 
attitude ascriptions—focus a spotlight on situations in which the conceptions that speakers associate 
with proper names are important pieces of information they convey when they utter them.  As 
discussed in section 1.1 supra, speakers would typically utter sentence (2)  
 
(2)  Clark Kent is Superman     
 
to communicate two conceptions of Kent-Super—a ‘Clark Kent-y’ mild-mannered reporter conception 
and a ‘Superman-y’ strong superhero conception—and say that both conceptions relate to the same 





         ¬ (4)  Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman 
 
to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super conceived in a Clark Kent-y way is the same person 
as Kent-Super conceived in a Superman-y way.  They use sentence ¬ (5) 
 
         ¬ (5) Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent flies 
 
to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super flies when she conceives him in a Clark Kent-y way.   
 Even the two occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ in sentence (1) 
 
(1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent 
 
could, under certain circumstances, be used to pick out different conceptions of the same individual.   
For example, consider again the example discussed in section 1.1, supra:  a man named ‘Tom’ meets 
Clark Kent, the reporter for the Daily Planet, at a party and suspects that he is the Clark Kent he went 
to Kindergarten with in Smallville.  Tom utters (1) to himself to express his belief that the Clark Kent 
from the party is the same Clark Kent he went to Kindergarten with in Smallville.  Here, (1) is used not 
to express a trivial self-identity (that an individual is identical to himself)—but rather to say something 
informative. The two tokenings of ‘Clark Kent’ in (1) allude to difference conceptions of Kent-
Super—one the conception of an adult man met at a party and the other of a Kindergartner. 
Alternatively, consider Kripke’s Paderewski case (1979). A man named ‘Peter’ might say ‘Paderewski 
the pianist has musical talent, but Paderewski the politician surely does not,’ failing to realize that the 
pianist and the politician are the same person. Someone might say to Peter ‘But Peter, Paderewski is 
Paderewski’ to inform him that Paderewski the politician is the same person as Paderewski the 
musician. Here, ‘… Paderewski is Paderewski’ is used to express an informative proposition and not to 




difference conceptions of the man—one the conception of a pianist and the other of a politician. 
At the same time, in some conversational contexts (perhaps in most), speakers lack the intent to 
convey conceptions when they utter a name. In most cases, speakers use names not to draw contrasts 
between what is or is not the case depending on how an object or individual is conceived (e.g., 
contrasting Lois Lane’s varying beliefs with respect to Kent-Super depending on how she conceives 
him) but merely to direct the audience’s attention to the right object so that the speaker can say 
something about the object.  
There is ample evidence that proper names are often used merely to pick out their referent. 
According to Lycan (2000), it is “undeniable” that a proper name may be used inside the ‘that’-clause 
of propositional attitude ascriptions “just to refer to its bearer, without any further suggestion about the 
way in which the subject of the belief sentence (the “ascribee”) would have represented the bearer.”  
Lycan (2000) offers the following example:    
“Suppose that Smith and Jones are among the few people who know that their acquaintance Jacques is in fact the 
notorious jewel thief that has been terrorizing Paris' wealthy set, called “Le Chat” in the popular press and by the 
gendarmes.  Smith and Jones read in the newspaper after a particularly daring but flawed robbery that gendarmes 
believe “Le Chat dropped the fistful of anchovies as he or she ran.”  Smith and Jones say to each other, “The 
gendarmes think Jacques dropped the anchovies as he ran.””   
 
Here, it is clear that Smith and Jones’ use of the name ‘Jacques’ is not intended to suggest that the 
gendarmes would use the name ‘Jacques’ to refer to the thief.  In fact, the gendarmes would do no such 
thing. They would refer to the thief only using the name ‘Le Chat.’ The gendarmes have no idea that 
Jacques is Le Chat.  Smith and Jones nevertheless use ‘Jacques’ to refer to the thief because they are 
indifferent to the way that the gendarmes conceive the thief and their concern in uttering this sentence 
to one another is merely to say of their acquaintance, who is the thief, that the gendarmes believe he 
dropped the anchovies.  Any name that refers to their acquaintance Jacques/Le Chat (any name with 
which both Smith and Jones are mutually familiar) will do, and any conceptions that either they or the 




with one another in this context.24  
 English has a convention for expressly indicating that a speaker is using a proper name in a 
propositional attitude ascription just to refer.  One may use a “syntactically de re belief ascription.”  
That is, one places “of” in front of a proper name and positions it outside of the ‘that’-clause of a 
propositional attitude ascription.  Although the sentence ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies’ 
strikes us as false, the sentence ‘Lois Lane believes of Clark Kent that he flies’ is indubitably true.25  
She believes this of him because she believes Superman can fly, and Clark Kent is Superman.26  Here, 
the “of” makes it clear that the speaker intends the name “Clark Kent” not to call up in his or her 
audience the conceptions ordinarily associated with the name; the speaker is rather using the name 
merely as a device of pure reference to designate a particular individual, who is sometimes referred to 
as ‘Clark Kent’ and sometimes as ‘Superman,’ and then indicate a belief that Lois Lane has with 
respect to this individual.  Here we have an example of a proper name used merely to refer.  As the 
example from Lycan (cited above) shows, ordinary propositional attitude ascriptions without the “of,” 
i.e., ascriptions that are not syntactically de re, also readily admit of a de re reading.  The de re reading 
                                                 
24  Lycan also points out that definite descriptions, as well as proper names, can be used inside the ‘that’-clause of a 
propositional attitude ascription just to refer and not to suggest anything about the way in which the ascribee conceives of 




(3) Columbus reckoned that Castro’s island was only a few miles from India. 
 
We all know what one would mean in asserting (3); the speaker would mean that when Columbus sighted Cuba he 
thought that he was already in the East Indies and was approaching India proper.  Of course, being 450 years early, 
Columbus did not know anything about Fidel Castro; yet we can assert (3) with no presumption that its 
complement clause represents things in the way that Columbus himself represented them.  The speaker makes this 
reference to Cuba without at all assuming that Columbus would have referred to Cuba in that way or in any 
parallel or analogous way.  So it seems undeniable that there are transparent positions inside belief sentences, in 
which the referring expression does just refer to its bearer, without any further suggestion about the way in which 
the subject of the belief sentence would have represented the bearer.  Singular terms can be and are often 
understood transparently.” 
 
25 One could also write this syntactically de re ascription as ‘Clark Kent is such that Lois believes that he flies,’ although 
such a construction is less common in ordinary parlance.  
 
26 She also simultaneously believes of him that he cannot fly, since she believes he cannot fly when she thinks of him under 




is, I think, the default reading of propositional attitude ascriptions.  I surmise that a speaker may resort 
to a syntactically de re sentence structure to avoid a potential misunderstanding by his audience—
where the speaker reckons that his audience may fail to accord his utterance of an ascription sentence 
the de re reading s/he intends.  For example, consider again Lycan’s example, supra. We can imagine 
that Smith might turn to Jones and utter ‘The gendarmes think Jacques dropped the anchovies as he 
ran’ and Jones might erroneously take Smith’s use of the name ‘Jacques’ to imply that the gendarmes 
have found out that Jacques is Le Chat, even if Smith has no intention of suggesting any such thing.  
To avoid implying this, Smith could use the syntactically de re ascription ‘The gendarmes believe of 
Jacques that he dropped the anchovies as he ran.’ However, he would not have to resort to the 
syntactically de re ascription form, given that there is a perfectly natural de re reading of the non-
syntactically de re ascription sentence.  
Let us consider a further example of a non-syntactically de re propositional attitude ascription 
where a speaker may intend a de re reading.  Suppose I utter “Everyone who has ever heard him sing 
believes that Elton John has a great voice.” ‘Elton John’ is the stage name of the famous pop star 
whose birth name was ‘Reginald Dwight.’  By using the name ‘Elton John’ in this ascription sentence, 
am I restricting myself to saying that those who have heard Elton John sing qua famous pop singer 
named ‘Elton John’ thinks he has a good voice?  Or could I very well intend my utterance to mean that 
everyone who has heard Elton John sing thought he had a good voice, whether they knew him as 
‘Reginald Dwight’ or ‘Elton John,’ or whether they heard him sing before or after he became a famous 
pop star with a flashy persona?  I think the latter is the case. I could very well intend a de re reading of 
‘Elton John,’ uttering the name just to refer to that individual regardless of how conceived, and say that 
any person who ever heard him sing, from his childhood music teacher up to one of his biggest fans as 
a pop star, thought he had a great voice.  I would intend that my audience interpret my utterance in 





Here is another example of a propositional attitude ascription where a speaker uses a name 
inside the ‘that’-clause of a propositional attitude ascription as a device of pure reference. Suppose that 
Jimmy Olson, Perry White, and Perry White's secretary, Janet Smith, were all “enlightened” about the 
identity of Clark Kent and Superman (i.e., they all realize that Clark Kent is Superman).  Furthermore, 
they all mutually know that each of them is enlightened.  One morning, Olson says to White: “Clark 
Kent is so tall, he could probably play in the NBA. He's over seven feet tall!”  White is somewhat 
skeptical about Olson’s judgment of Clark Kent’s height. That afternoon, White remarks to Smith, his 
secretary: “Jimmy Olson believes that Clark Kent is over seven feet tall. But I think he’s more like 6’ 
9’’.”  Because White knows that Smith knows that Clark Kent is Superman and he knows that Smith 
knows that Olson knows this fact as well, White could just as well have said to Smith: “Jimmy Olson 
believes that Superman is over seven feet tall.”  Either of these propositional attitude ascriptions 
would, under the circumstances described, communicate the very same information.  White could use 
either of the names of Kent-Super, ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman,’ to refer to him, and he would not have 
to be concerned about any conceptions that he, Olson, or Smith (his audience) might associate with 
those names.  In this conversational context, conceptions associated with names make no difference 
with respect to the information communicated.  The speaker is at liberty to be indifferent to which 
name he uses in the ‘that’-clause because he uses the name just to refer, and given the audience he is 
addressing, any name that refers to Kent-Super (with which his audience is familiar) will communicate 
the same information.  
Now let us consider an example of a simple sentence (i.e., a non-propositional attitude 
ascription) in which a proper name is used just to refer.   Consider again what Olson said to White in 
                                                 
27 Of course, I will want to argue that one could use the name ‘Elton John’ to be Conception-indicating, picking out the man 
under his famous performer persona. My point here is that it seems undeniable that a speaker could utter this sentence 





the above paragraph: “Clark Kent is so tall, he could probably play in the NBA. He's over seven feet 
tall!” Surely Olson uttered the name ‘Clark Kent’ just to refer to Kent-Super and not to communicate a 
Clark Kent-y conception of him to Olson.  After all, White and Olson mutually know that they are both 
enlightened about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman.  Olson and White both know that if Clark 
Kent is over seven feet tall, then so is Superman.  Olson could have made the same claim about Kent-
Super’s height using either the name ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman,’ and either way he would have made 
the very same claim and White would have understood him as making that claim regardless of which 
name he used.  Differing conceptions of Kent-Super are irrelevant to whether what Olson said is true 
or false, and both Olson and White are aware of this.    
Unenlightened speakers such as Lois Lane can (and often do) use the names ‘Clark Kent’ and 
‘Superman’ in Millian ways—just to refer.   For example, suppose that Lois Lane is asked to name a 
non-avian flying being and in response utters (8).  
 
(8) Superman flies 
 
Here, she uses the name ‘Superman’ just to refer to Kent-Super.  She would not use the name 
‘Superman’ to make her Superman-y way of conceiving him salient and contrast this with a Clark 
Kent-y way of conceiving him.  She has no idea that these are different conceptions of the very same 
individual.  As far as she knows she only has one way of conceiving him.  When she utters (8), Clark 
Kent is not on her mind, nor does she feel any need to distinguish between Clark Kent and Superman 
with respect to his ability to fly. This is not to say that she attaches the same conceptions to the names 
‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’  On the contrary, she has very different conceptions of Kent-Super when 
she thinks of him under a Clark Kent-y conception and when she thinks of him under a Superman-y 
conception.  But she would not use the names to make those conceptions salient, or contribute them to 




various ways he is conceived.  She thinks that these names refer to distinct individuals, rather than to 
different conceptions of the same individual.    
Likewise, if Lois were asked to name a non-avian being incapable of flight, she might utter  
¬ (7) in response. 
 
¬ (7) Clark Kent does not fly 
 
Here again, Lois utters ‘Clark Kent’ just to refer to Kent-Super. She would not use ‘Clark Kent’ to call 
attention to or make salient a Clark Kent-y conception and contrast this with a Superman-y conception, 
for she has no idea that these are conceptions of the same individual. When she utters ¬ (7), a 
Superman-y conception of Kent-Super is not on her mind.   
 Finally, we have the utterance of sentence (1) where the speaker intends to express a trivial 
self-identity, to say merely that the man is identical to himself.  The speaker would use the name 
‘Clark Kent’ twice over just refer to the same individual twice over, intending each tokening of the 
name to have the identical semantic content.  The speaker is not attaching different conceptions to each 
occurrence of the name in order to express an informative identity sentence, as he or she would if she 
uttered sentence (2) to say that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person or uttered (1) to say, 
e.g., that the Clark Kent the speaker met at the party is Clark Kent the speaker’s Kindergarten 
classmate in Smallville.28   
In the examples above, speakers use the names just to refer, full stop.  Indeed, proper names are 
most frequently used just to refer. They are used in what I call ‘Millian’ ways.  However, the very 
existence of Frege’s puzzles demonstrates that the Millian claim that merely referring is the only use of 
proper names is erroneous.  In the puzzle cases, speakers clearly use proper names to convey 
                                                 
28 Here, ignore the fact that practically no one would ever utter (1) as an uninformative identity in a genuine conversation.  
People do not generally go around saying obvious and uninformative things.  They do not usually say that anything is 
identical to itself because the self-identity of any object or person does not need to be pointed out. Sentence (1) qua 
uninformative identity would most likely be uttered in a philosophical logic class as an example of the principle that 




conceptions as well as to refer—they use names in ‘Conception-indicating’ ways. Conceptions figure 
prominently into the truth conditions of the propositions speakers express in uttering sentences. I shall 
claim that these conceptions are constituents of the propositions expressed.  This is the simplest and 
most intuitive way to make sense of the intuitive cognitive and true-value differences in the Frege’s 
puzzle cases. Hence, the TIUT posits that proper names have two uses: to refer only (names used in a 




2.2    Definitions: “Dossier Tokens,” “Dossier Types,” “Subjects” 
In explaining the character and content of names used in Millian and Conception-indicating 
ways (in sections 2.3 and 2.4), I use the following terms of art: “dossier tokens,” “dossier types,” and 
“subjects.”  Hence, I will define these terms of art here. 
Dossier tokens and their subjects 
Graeme Forbes (1990) developed a theory of proper names in which the notion of dossier plays 
a key role.  According to Forbes, “when we receive what we take to be de re information which we 
have an interest in retaining, our [mental] operating system may create a locus, or dossier, where such 
information is held; and any further information which we take to be about the same object can be filed 
along with information about it we already possess… The role of a name is to identify a dossier for a 
particular object… we use names to “label” dossiers (Forbes, 538).”  I adopt this basic characterization 
of dossiers from Forbes.  Dossiers are like encyclopedia entries or files in the mind of an agent: they 
                                                 
29 I do not wish to foreclose the possibility that there are other uses of proper names, in addition to Millian and Conception-
indicating uses.  For example, sometimes proper names are used to refer to aspects or time-slices of individuals or objects. 
In the sentence, ‘I have been to Chemnitz but never to Karl-Marx-Stadt,’ one could plausibly argue that the names refer to 
different (thick) time-slices of a single German city. Or consider ‘Clark Kent went into the phone both and Superman came 
out’, which example is due to Jennifer Saul (1998).  Here, I would contend that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are not co-
referential, as they refer to different aspects of a single individual. Clark Kent are distinct entities, even if they inhere within 




have “subjects”—they contain de re information, information about particular persons or objects—and 
they contain stores of descriptive and perceptual representations associated with and thought by an 
agent to characterize the subject of the dossier, i.e., what I refer to as conceptions. Simply put, each 
dossier is about a particular individual/object (a subject) and contains information about what the 
individual/object is thought to be like by the agent (a conception).  Lois Lane has one dossier that is 
about Kent-Super (Kent-Super is its subject) and presents him conceptually in a “Clark Kent-y” way—
as a mild-mannered reporter.  Her dossier contains the representation, inter alia, named ‘Clark Kent’, 
and it is labeled with the name ‘Clark Kent.’  So this dossier both contains as part of the representation 
of its subject that the subject bears the name ‘Clark Kent’ and the dossier itself is labeled ‘Clark Kent.’   
Lois also has another dossier that is about Kent-Super (it likewise has Kent-Super as its subject) and 
presents him conceptually in a “Superman-y” way—as a strong superhero. This dossier contains the 
representation, inter alia, named ‘Superman’, and it is labeled with the name ‘Superman.’ So this 
dossier both contains as part of the representation of its subject that the subject bears the name 
‘Superman’ and the dossier itself is labeled ‘Superman.’  
On Forbes’ theory, as on the TIUT, the subject of a dossier token is not necessarily the 
individual that the descriptive and perceptual representations that make up the conception in the 
dossier best ‘fit.’  In the terminology of Kent Bach (1987, 12) the subject of a dossier is determined 
relationally, not satisfactionally.30 Whereas the denotation of a definite description is determined 
satisfactionally because its denotation is just whatever object satisfies or best fits it, by contrast the 
                                                 
30 Bach has characterized the distinction between “relational” and “satisfactional” properties as follows (Bach, 1987, 12): 
“If all your thoughts about things could only be descriptive, your total conception of the world would be merely qualitative. 
You would never be related in thought to anything in particular. Thinking of something would never be a case of having it 
‘in mind,’ as we say colloquially, or as some philosophers have said, of being ‘en rapport,’ in ‘cognitive contact,’ or 
‘epistemically intimate’ with it. But picturesque phrases aside, just what is this special relation? Whatever it is, it is 
different from that involved in thinking of something under a description. If we can even speak of a relation in the latter 
case, it is surely not a real (or natural) relation. Since the object of a descriptive thought is determined 
SATISFACTIONALLY, the fact that the thought is of that object does not require any connection between thought and 
object. However, the object of a de re thought is determined RELATIONALLY. For something to be the object of a de re 





subjecthood of a dossier depends on the existence of an appropriate causal relation between the dossier 
and its subject that explain the dossier’s coming into being.  The subjecthood or ‘aboutness’ of a 
dossier can be analogized to the aboutness of a photograph.  Suppose that President Obama sits for a 
photograph and quite surprisingly, perhaps because of an odd camera and/or lighting, he strongly 
resembles Malcolm X.  Despite the greater resemblance to Malcolm X, the resulting photograph is 
nevertheless a photograph of Obama and not of Malcolm X, because there is a causal relation obtaining 
between Obama and the photograph that does not obtain between Malcolm-X and the photograph.  The 
photo came into being because Obama, and not Malcolm-X, sat for it. The ‘aboutness’ or ‘of-ness’ or 
subjecthood of photographs is determined relationally rather than satisfactionally, and the same is the 
case with dossiers.31  
Lois Lane’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier has Kent-Super as its subject because she causally 
interacted with Kent-Super (in his Clark Kent guise) and this resulted in the creation in her mind of the 
‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier. Kent-Super is also the subject of Lois’ ‘Superman’-labeled dossier for 
the same reason, i.e., she causally interacted with Kent-Super (in his Superman guise) and this led to 
the creation of her ‘Superman’-labeled dossier in her mind. Dossiers may also be established in an 
agent’s mind in the absence of direct causal contact between the agent and the dossier’s subject, as 
when an agent hears about an individual by name. The subject of the dossier that comes into being 
would be the individual causally-historically linked to the name the agent heard roughly along the lines 
of Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference (Kripke, 1980). (See 
                                                 
31 The property of dossier subjecthood could very well turn out to be partially satisfactional.  It is plausible to claim that 
successfully referring requires the agent to have some accurate descriptive beliefs about the referent (and be free of certain 
grossly inaccurate beliefs).  In no possible world is Albert Einstein a mountain in Switzerland or an abstract object.  We 
might want to say that a speaker whose ‘Albert Einstein’-labeled dossier was causal-historically connected to the flesh and 
blood Albert Einstein in the right sort of way, but who had gotten it into his head (because of some sort of bizarre 
idiosyncratic circumstance) that the name referred to a mountain in Switzerland or an abstract object would fail to refer to 
Albert Einstein in uttering ‘Albert Einstein.’  In this paper, I remain neutral/agnostic vis-à-vis the issue of the correct theory 
of reference except insofar as I reject the notion that reference (or dossier subjecthood) might be purely satisfactional, as a 





http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/#CauThe for discussion of Kripke’s causal-historical picture 
of reference).32 
Dossier types and their individuation criteria  
I have characterized dossier tokens above.  The TIUT distinguishes between dossier tokens and 
dossier types.  Dossier types are individuated by their subject and their conception.  That is to say, 
dossier tokens with the same subject and the same (or substantially similar) conception of their subject 
instantiate the same dossier type. Thus, if two individuals, i1 and i2, each have a dossier token with 
Kent-Super as its subject and containing a “Clark Kent-y” mild-mannered reporter conception, i1 and i2 
have dossier tokens instantiating the same dossier type. 
                                                 
32 Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference runs into a difficulty with so-called empty and fictional names such as 
‘Pegasus’ or ‘Santa Claus.’  It is not possible to be in causal contact with Santa Claus, for only existent objects can enter 
into causal relations.  What, according to Kripke, does ‘Santa Claus’ refer to when there no object whatsoever causally 
linked to the name?  If ‘Santa Claus’ and other empty or fictional names did not refer, they would contribute nothing to the 
propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur, meaning that sentences containing empty or fictional proper 
names would fail to express complete propositions, resulting in truth-value gaps.  Problematically, obviously true sentences 
such as ‘Santa Claus is fictional’ would express no proposition whatsoever and lack true-value.   
A modified version of Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference, which would have to be worked out, could 
explain the reference of empty and fictional names.  Although we cannot be causally connected to Santa Claus himself, we 
can indeed be causally connected to the individual or individuals who invented the Santa Claus legend.  The name ‘Santa 
Claus’ would refer to Santa Claus not because of a causal connection between a dubber and the actual Santa Claus (ignore 
the fact that Saint Nicholas, on whom the legend was loosely based, was a real person) but because a person uttering the 
name ‘Santa Claus’ is linked by a causal chain to the person who originated/created the fictional work/myth and his act of 
creation and transmission of the myth to others (either orally or in writing).  Such a theory of reference would explain 
certain aspects of reference that no Descriptivist theory of reference could.  For example, suppose that there were, by sheer 
coincidence, two legends that use the name ‘Santa Claus’ to talk about a toy-giving man living at the North Pole.  Two 
children, Jan and Joan, only superficially conversant with the details of the legends, associate identical descriptive 
information with ‘Santa Claus.’  Jan’s use of ‘Santa Claus’ stems from hearing one legend, and Joan’s use stems from 
hearing the other legend.  Both utter: ‘I hope Santa Claus brings me lots of toys this year.’  Intuitively, Jan and Joan are 
talking about different things.  They are expressing their desires vis-à-vis different mythical characters.  On a Descriptivist 
picture of reference, Jan and Joan would express the same proposition in uttering this sentence, for they associate identical 
descriptions with the name ‘Santa Claus.’  Descriptivism predicts incorrectly that Jan and Joan are speaking about the same 
mythical character, when they are not. Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference, suitably modified, might be capable 
of explaining why Jan and Joan do not refer to the same mythical character: the causal chain of transmission of the two 
stories they heard lead back to two completely distinct acts of fiction-creation.  If the individuals who created the legends 
set them down in writing, then we can trace Jan and Joan’s uses of ‘Santa Claus’ causally back to distinct literary corpuses.      
It remains mysterious what exactly so-called empty names refer to. Some philosophers think that ‘Santa Claus’ 
fails to refer altogether.  But I take that to be highly implausible. The better view is that it refers to a fictional person.  In 
agreement with a growing body of literature on empty and fictional names (see Kroon 2011), I take the thesis that these so-
called empty names fail to refer at all to be highly implausible. Salmon (1998) and Soames (2002, 89-95) have argued 
forcefully against the notion that (most) empty names lack referents. The better view is that fictional/mythical names refer 
to mythical or fictional characters/objects.  ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ means that Santa Claus is not real—that he is 
fictional or mythical.  But Santa Claus is something—he is a mythical/fictional object.  The metaphysical status of 
fictional/mythical characters or objects is mysterious. Are they abstract objects, non-existent concrete particulars, or some 





More about Dossiers 
Enlightened agents, as well as unenlightened agents, may have multiple dossiers for the same 
subject.  Suppose that Jimmy Olson is ‘enlightened’—he realizes that Clark Kent is Superman. He may 
nevertheless maintain two separate dossiers, one labeled ‘Clark Kent’ and one labeled ‘Superman,’ 
each dossier containing different conceptions of their common subject, Kent-Super.  There would be 
some overlapping representations in his two dossiers reflecting the fact that Olson believes that the 
dossiers have the same subject. Perhaps the dossiers are ‘linked’ in his cognitive architecture, 
reflecting the fact that he knows that they have the same subject. The enlightened Olson’s ‘Clark 
Kent’-labeled dossier and his ‘Superman’-labeled dossier cannot match the ‘Clark Kent’-labeled and 
‘Superman’-labeled dossiers of the unenlightened Lois Lane perfectly. Olson’s dossiers contain 
representations reflecting his awareness that the dossiers are about the same subject, whereas Lois’ 
corresponding dossiers lack that representation. Nevertheless, by having two dossiers, Olson can 
conceive Kent-Super in either a Clark Kent-y or Superman-y way, thus mirroring Lois’ distinct 
conceptions of Kent-Super.  Olson’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier and his ‘Superman’-labeled dossier 
are sufficiently similar to Lois’ such that his dossiers are of the same dossier types as hers despite his 
added knowledge of Clark Kent and Superman’s identity.     
The structure of an agent’s dossiers and the representations contained in them—the agent’s 
“mental architecture”—is dynamic, such that agents regularly restructure the data in their dossiers, split 
one dossier into two, and merge dossiers. Some of these restructuring changes are permanent, while 
others involve the creation of temporary dossiers.  For example, suppose that instead of two linked 
dossiers about Kent-Super, one ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier and one ‘Superman’-labeled dossier, the 
enlightened Jimmy Olson maintained one single dossier on Kent-Super labeled with both the names 
‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’ Inside of this single dossier are all of the conceptual representations 




separate dossiers, one labeled ‘Clark Kent’ and containing a Clark Kent-y conception and the other 
labeled ‘Superman’ and containing a Superman-y conception.  Perhaps this would not entail the actual 
breaking up of the original, unified, doubly-labeled dossier (the “mother dossier”), but rather the 
creation of two “temporary” dossiers, into one of which Olson’s operating system loads the Clark 
Kent-y conceptual material and which is then labeled ‘Clark Kent,’ and the other into which is loaded 
the Superman-y conceptual material and which is then labeled ‘Superman.’ Presumably, this could be 
carried out rapidly because the different conceptions are already distinguished within the mother 
dossier; perhaps the different conceptions are already sorted into different sub-dossiers or they come to 
be encoded differently in the mother dossier such that they can be recognized as belonging to a Clark 
Kent-y or a Superman-y conception.  
Whether Olson has maintained separate yet linked dossiers for Clark Kent and Superman or has 
merged the dossiers upon learning that Clark Kent is Superman, we recognize his capacity to reflect 
upon Kent-Super under different conceptions.   As sketched above, there are various possible ways for 
Olson to organize dossiers in his mental architecture; various ways for him to arrange dossiers so as to 
contain sub-dossiers into which conceptual representations are organized and catalogued; and various 
ways for him to structure his or her dossiers or create temporary dossiers.  Whether Olson has 
maintained two separately labeled dossiers or has a unified mother dossier for Kent-Super doubly 
labeled with ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman,’ he has the capacity to entertain dossiers that are of the same 
or similar types as those possessed by Lois Lane in her mental architecture.  Olson thus has the 
capacity to mirror the layout of Lois’ mental architecture vis-à-vis Kent-Super within his own dossier 
organization.  He can, as it were, adopt the point of view of Lois and see the world from her 
perspective by modeling her mental architecture.  
The dossier metaphor is a fruitful device for conceptualizing and theorizing about the structure 




workings of the mind, the dossier metaphor will have to remain metaphorical, the science detailing the 
true workings of the mind’s operating system still being in its infancy. In addition to Forbes and 
myself, several other philosophers have taken the dossier metaphor to be an illuminating tool for 
reflecting upon de re belief.   The idea of a mental file or dossier has been around for almost fifty 
years.  According to Francois Recanati (2013, 3), who makes extensive use of the notion of mental 
files in his 1993 and 2013, the notion of mental files or dossiers “was introduced by several 
philosophers in the late sixties or early seventies, in connection with the referential use of definite 
descriptions (Grice 1969, 140-44) or with identity statements (Lockwood 1971, 208-11; Strawson 
1974, 54-56). It was subsequently exploited by several authors, including Evans (1973, 199; 1982, 
276), Bach (1987, 34-37), Devitt (1989, 227-31), Forbes (1989, 1990, 538-45), Crimmins (1992, 87-
92)…” and Perry (1980).  
I shall qualify a bit the claim I made above that agents take the representations in dossiers to 
characterize the subject of the dossier.  The enlightened Jimmy Olson, who knows that Clark Kent is 
Superman, can conceive Kent-Super in a Clark Kent-y way or in a Superman-y way just as Lois does.  
However, there are some differences.  Lois’ ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier represents him as weak and 
indecisive.  However, Olson’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier does not represent Clark Kent as genuinely 
weak and indecisive, since Olson realizes that Kent-Super is in fact strong and decisive and is putting 
on an act when he is being Clark Kent. Whereas Lois’ dossier represents him as weak and indecisive, 
Olson’s dossier represents him as weak acting or seemingly weak.  Or perhaps his dossier contains the 
representation weak and indecisive but Olson treats this representation as fictional—with a healthy 
dose of suspension of disbelief.  So Olson is able to conceptualize Clark Kent as weak, despite 
knowing, at some level, that it is only as if he were weak.  Olson, being enlightened, cannot associate 




there is sufficient similarity between their representations in their respective ‘Clark Kent’-labeled and 
‘Superman’-labeled dossiers such that we may say their dossier tokens are of the same dossier type.   
 Forbes (1990) claims that proper names label dossiers but he is silent on the issue of whether in 
addition to the name ‘NN’ labeling a dossier, the representation bears the name ‘NN’ is stored inside 
the ‘NN’-labeled dossier itself.  The TIUT take a clear position on this issue: in addition to the name 
‘NN’ labeling a dossier, the dossier also has the representation bears the name ‘NN’ inside the dossier, 
i.e., the representation that the subject of the dossier bears the name ‘NN’ is a part of the conception in 
the dossier.  In some cases, this representation about the name that the subject bears might be the one 
and only representation in the dossier.   
 Forbes does not expressly mention the issue of label-less dossiers.  The TIUT posits that 
dossiers sometimes fail to be labeled with proper names.  Suppose a man named “Bob” meets a woman 
at a party who makes a strong impression on him but Bob fails to learn her name.  Nevertheless, within 
Bob’s mental architecture a dossier is created when the encounter takes place for the purpose of 
collecting and storing de re information about that specific woman.  Perhaps Bob’s dossier on this 
woman would lack a label altogether, or a definite description could serve as a temporary label until 
Bob finds out her name, or Bob’s file could be labeled with a perceptual image of the woman.   
A dossier might fail to be labeled with a proper name for another reason. Sometimes agents 
forget names.  A dossier originally labeled with a proper name might lose its label over time. 
Nevertheless, that dossier might continue to exist, despite the disappearance of the name labeling it. 
Forgetting a name is not tantamount to forgetting an individual.  Agents remember objects and 
individuals not only by their names but also by the descriptive and perceptual information they have 








2.3   Names Used in a ‘Millian’ Way 
 
When employed merely to refer, the TIUT posits that names are used as indexicals that have a 
two-tiered semantic structure, consisting of the following character and content: 
 
Character of Millian Name ‘NN’: The subject of the ‘NN’-labeled dossier token, d, mentally 
entertained simultaneous with this very utterance of ‘NN’ and 
from whose label the speaker draws ‘NN’ 
 
Content of/Referent of  
Millian Name ‘NN’: < the subject of d >   the very individual/object itself bearing the name 
 
By way of clarification, here is what I mean by “the speaker draws ‘NN’ from the dossier 
label” in the definition of character, supra.  Let us suppose a dossier token a speaker mentally 
entertains is labeled ‘NN.’ The speaker can “read” both the contents of the dossier as well as the label 
of the dossier s/he entertains before his/her mind’s eye.  In reading the dossier’s label ‘NN’ and then 
uttering ‘NN,’ the speaker “draws the name from the dossier’s label.”    
To illustrate the content and character of names used in a Millian way, consider for example 
Lois’ Millian uses of the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ when she utters (8) and ¬ (7).33 
 
  (8) Superman flies 
         ¬ (7) Clark Kent does not fly   
 
At the moment she utters ¬ (7), Lois mentally entertains her ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier—a 
dossier that has Kent-Super as its subject with a Clark Kent-y conception.  She draws the name ‘Clark 
Kent’ from of the dossier’s label, i.e., she reads the name on the label and utters it.  By virtue of the 
Millian character, the content of her utterance is the subject of the dossier token from which she drew 
the name—Kent-Super.  Kent-Super, the content of ‘Clark Kent’ in the context, is also the referent of 
                                                 
33 As mentioned above, Lois Lane would use the name ‘Superman’ in a Millian way—just to refer to him, not to call 
attention to her “Superman-y” way of conceiving him, for as far as she knows she only has one way of conceiving him. She 
has no reason or ability to contrast her Superman-y conception of Kent-Super with her Clark Kent-y conception of him 




‘Clark Kent.’   When she utters (8), Lois entertains her ‘Superman’-labeled dossier—a dossier that has 
Kent-Super as its subject with a Superman-y conception.  She draws the name ‘Superman’ from of the 
dossier’s label, i.e., she reads the name on the label and utters it.  By virtue of the Millian character, the 
content of her utterance is the subject of the dossier token from which she drew the name—Kent-
Super.  Kent-Super, the content of ‘Superman’ in the context, is also the referent of ‘Superman.’    
Both of her utterances of the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ refer to Kent-Super (whether 
Lois realizes it or not) because in both cases the Millian character maps the utterances to Kent-Super.  
That is, Kent-Super is the subject of both of the dossiers entertained and it is from these dossiers’ 
labels that Lois draws the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’ 
 
 
2.4 Names Used in a ‘Conception-Indicating’ Way 
 
When used in a ‘Conception-indicating’ way, a name functions as an indexical that contributes 
both the referent and a conception of it to the proposition.  Unlike names used in a Millian way, which 
have a two-tiered semantics (character and content/referent), names used in a Conception-indicating 
way have a three-tiered semantics. 
Character of Conception- 
indicating Name ‘NN’:       The subject individuating  [[the dossier type, D, instantiated by the ‘NN’- 
labeled dossier token, d, entertained 
simultaneous with this very utterance ‘NN’ 
and from whose label the speaker draws 
‘NN’]] 
 
  contributes ‘The subject individuating’       contributes ‘D’ to content 
    to content  
 
Content of Conception- 
indicating Name ‘NN’: The subject individuating D     a definite description 
             
            denotes 
 
 





The boldfaced double brackets in the statement of character is the convention I use to indicate that ‘the 
subject individuating’ does not operate on the language contained within the double brackets at the 
level of character. ‘The subject individuating’ contributes itself, qua linguistic entity, to content, as the 
upper leftmost arrow indicates.  ‘D’, a name for the dossier type denoted by the definite description 
inside the double boldfaced brackets, is also contributed to content, as the upper rightmost arrow 
indicates.  D is the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token, d, that the speaker mentally entertains 
when uttering the name and from whose label s/he draws the name (see section 2.3, second paragraph, 
supra, for meaning of “draws a name”).   
The content of ‘NN’ in the context is given by the definite description ‘The subject 
individuating D.’ The referent of ‘NN’ in the context is the denotation of this definite description, 
i.e., the subject by which D is individuated.  
What then would be the proposition expressed by sentence (2)?  For the sake of convenience, 
let us henceforth refer to the proposition expressed by sentence (2) as “PROP-2.”  Consider sentence 
(2) as uttered by the enlightened Jimmy Olson when he is trying to convince Lois Lane that PROP-2, 
i.e., that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person.  
 
(2) Clark Kent is Superman 
 
Olson would use ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in a Conception-indicating way in (2), for he wants to 
distinguish between different conceptions of Kent-Super by using different names for Kent-Super.  He 
aims for his conceptions of Kent-Super, one conception in a dossier he labels ‘Clark Kent’ and one 
conception in a dossier he labels ‘Superman,’ as much as possible to resemble Lois’ Clark Kent-y and 
Superman-y conceptions of Kent-Super in her respective separate ‘Clark Kent’-labeled and 
‘Superman’-labeled dossiers.  Olson’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier presents its subject, Kent-Super, 




it is labeled ‘Clark Kent’ and draws the name from the label (he utters ‘Clark Kent’).  By virtue of the 
Conception-indicating character, the content of ‘Clark Kent’ in the context is given by the definite 
description: 
  
 The subject individuating DCK  
 
Here, DCK is the dossier type instantiated by Olson’s dossier token that has Kent-Super as subject and a 
Clark Kent-y conception, and from whose label he draws ‘Clark Kent.’   
Olson’s ‘Superman’-labeled dossier token presents its subject, Kent-Super, under a Superman-y 
conception.  He mentally entertains the dossier, sees that it is labeled ‘Superman’ and draws the name 
from the label (he utters ‘Superman’).  By virtue of the Conception-indicating character, the content of 
‘Superman’ in the context is given by the definite description: 
  
 The subject individuating DSM  
 
Here, DSM is the dossier type instantiated by the Olson’s dossier token that has Kent-Super as subject 
and a Superman-y conception, and from whose label he draws ‘Superman.’   
The content of the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are different in this context, since 
their contents are given by different definite descriptions containing expressions referring to 
different dossier types. Nevertheless, the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ refer to the same 
individual, Kent-Super, because Kent-Super is the individual denoted by both definite 
descriptions. Both referent and conception are “in” content, albeit in an indirect way: by virtue of 
being the individuation criteria of the dossier type referenced by the definite description giving the 
content of each name in the context. So with Olson’s utterance of ‘Superman,’ both Kent-Super and a 
Superman-y conception are in content by virtue of the fact that dossier type DSM is individuated both 




Kent-Super and a Clark Kent-y conception are in content by virtue of the fact that DCK is individuated 
both by Kent-Super and a Clark Kent-y conception.  
N.B.: Although the TIUT claims that the content of these proper names is each given by a 
definite description, the TIUT is not a Descriptivist theory or proper names and is hence not vulnerable 
to Kripke’s arguments against Descriptivism.  While it is true that the contents of proper names are 
given by definite descriptions, importantly the names have these descriptive contents only relative to a 
particular use by a speaker in a particular conversational context. These definite descriptions do not 
give the meanings of these names in any wider sense.  The cross-speaker eternal meanings of these 
names are their characters, not their contents in a particular context, given that proper names are used 
as indexicals.  
Since these definite descriptions give the content of the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in 
the context, we can freely substitute these definite descriptions at the places where the names occur in 
(2) and the resulting sentence (2)† will express the same proposition as (2).   
 
(2)†     The subject individuating DCK is the subject individuating DSM 
  
Both (2) and (2)† express the same proposition, PROP-2.  However, unlike (2), (2)† opens a window 
onto the structure of PROP-2 that (2) does not, revealing why (2) is informative.  (2)† makes it evident 
on its face that PROP-2 is the proposition that there are two dossier types, DCK and DSM, individuated 
by the same subject but by different conceptions.  PROP-2 is not the uninformative and obvious 
proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super, as Millians maintain.  
Furthermore, since ‘DCK’ means the same thing as ‘the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super 
as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception,’ and ‘DSM’ means the same thing as ‘the dossier type 
individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception,’ we can substitute these 




sentence, (2)††, will express the same proposition as (2) and (2)†, PROP-2.   
 
(2)††  The subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject  
and a Clark Kent-y conception is the subject individuating the dossier type 
individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception.  
 
(2)†† opens an even more detailed window onto the nature of PROP-2 than (2)†.  (2)†† reveals that 
PROP-2 is the proposition that there are two dossier types, one individuated by a Clark Kent-y 
conception and the other by a Superman-y conception, both of which are individuated by the same 
subject, Kent-Super.  
 
2.5 Names are Rigid Designators on the TIUT 
 It should be uncontroversial that proper names are rigid designators when used in a Millian 
way, since it is uncontroversial that names are rigid designators according to all Millian theories. In 
fact, the revival of Millianism in the 1970’s was to a great extent a reaction to Kripke’s modal 
argument by which he convinced the vast majority of philosophers that names are rigid designators.     
Proper names are also rigid when used in a Conception-indicating way.  Here is why.  It is 
analytic that the subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a 
Clark-Kent-y conception (i.e., dossier type DCK) is Kent-Super. And it is likewise analytic that the 
subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y 
conception (i.e., dossier type DSM) is Kent-Super.  These dossier types are individuated by Kent-Super 
as their subject, meaning that these dossier types are defined by having Kent-Super as their subject. 
They have their subjects essentially.   If, per impossible, the subject individuating these dossier types 
were not Kent-Super in some possible world, we would not have these dossier types.  In every possible 
world, dossier types DCK and DSM are individuated by the same subject—Kent-Super. Hence, PROP-




are individuated by the same subject, Kent-Super—is true in every possible world.  
 Of course, not all tokenings of ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are drawn from dossiers 
instantiating dossier types individuated by Kent-Super as subject.34  A speaker might draw ‘Superman’ 
from a dossier token whose subject is Kent-Super but draw ‘Clark Kent’ from a dossier token whose 
subject is some person named ‘Clark Kent’ other than Kent-Super, i.e., a namesake, in which case 
‘Clark Kent is Superman’ would express a false proposition.  Hence, not every utterance of ‘Clark 
Kent is Superman’ will express a true proposition, let alone one that is true in every possible world.   
However, given that Lois or Olson (or whoever) actually draws the names ‘Clark Kent’ and 
‘Superman’ from dossier tokens that have Kent-Super as subject, dossier types individuated by Kent-
Super are loaded into content.  In every possible world, these dossier types (the ones actually 
instantiated by the dossier tokens of actual world speakers and loaded into content) are individuated by 
the same individual—Kent-Super.  Hence, Lois’ or Olson’s utterance of ‘Clark Kent is Superman,’ 
given that the dossiers tokens from which they draw the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ actually 
instantiate dossier types individuated by Kent-Super as subject, expresses a proposition true in every 




2.6   Solution to Frege’s Puzzle about Informative Identity Sentences 
 
Suppose Jimmy Olson utters (2) to say something informative, e.g., to disabuse Lois Lane of 
her ignorance that Clark Kent is Superman, as illustrated in section 2.4 above.  According to the TIUT, 
he would use the names in sentence (2) in a Conception-indicating way and, as I claimed in section 2.4 
supra, and he would express PROP-2, which could also be expressed by either sentence (2)† or (2)††. 
 
(2)†      The subject individuating DCK is the subject individuating DSM    
 





(2)††  The subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject  
and a Clark Kent-y conception is the subject individuating the dossier type 
individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception.  
 
By contrast, were Olson to utter (1) to express an uninformative identity, tokening the name ‘Clark 
Kent’ in Millian way twice over (i.e., merely referring twice to Kent-Super)—he would express PROP-
1, or the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super.35  PROP-1 could also be expressed by 
sentence (1)†. 
 
 (1)† Kent-Super is Kent-Super  
 
Comparing sentence (1)† with (2)††, it is manifest that (1) and (2) express different propositions.  
(1)† expresses the proposition that Kent-Super is identical to Kent-Super; no dossier types, subjects, or 
conceptions are mentioned in (1)†.  By contrast, it is evident on the face of sentence (2)†† that it 
expresses a completely different proposition: the proposition that there are two dossier types, one 
individuated by a Clark Kent-y conception and the other by a Superman-y conception, that are 
individuated by the same subject, Kent-Super.  The difference in cognitive value between (1) and (2) is 
therefore explained by their expressing different propositions.   
Here’s (a somewhat metaphorical description of) how Olson’s utterance of (2) manages to be 
informative to Lois. Upon hearing Olson utter (2), Lois Lane will inwardly inspect her own dossiers 
that bear the labels ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ and she will suppose that Olson is trying to 
communicate to her that these dossier tokens, the ones she has in her mental architecture labeled with 
those names, have the same subject. If she is skeptical that the mild-mannered guy she works with 
named ‘Clark Kent’ could really be bold and confident Superman, the superhero, she might check to 
make sure that the dossier types that Olson is referring to are the same as those instantiated by her 
                                                 
35
 Here, it helps to imagine that Olson is a philosopher or logician when we consider the possibility that Olson would utter 





‘Clark Kent’- and ‘Superman’-labeled tokens.  After all, Olson could be referring to some other person 
named ‘Clark Kent,’ a namesake, when he utters ‘Clark Kent’ in (2).  To check whether she has the 
right Clark Kent, she will ask Olson about the conceptions in the dossiers from which he drew the 
names.  She might ask him, e.g., “When you said ‘Clark Kent,’ did you mean the Clark Kent I work 
with, the reporter? You are claiming that that guy is Superman the Superhero?”  Olson may then 
double-check to ensure that he is in fact referring to that Clark Kent (via inspecting the dossier from 
which he drew ‘Clark Kent,’ making sure that this dossier corresponds conceptually to Lois’ ‘Clark 
Kent’-labeled dossier), and then confirm to Lois that he is referring to that Clark Kent.  If Lois believes 
that Olson intends to speak the truth (and not pulling her leg) and is a reliable source of information, 
she will come to accept that her own ‘Clark Kent’- and ‘Superman’-labeled dossiers have the same 
subject, just as Olson’s do, and thereby implicitly accept (as a matter of pure logic) that the dossier 
types her tokens instantiate are individuated by the same subject. Hence, she will have come to believe 
PROP-2, that Clark Kent is Superman (since the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman just is the 
proposition that these dossier types are individuated by the same subject).  
The TIUT solves the identity sentences puzzle where Millianism and Descriptivism each give 
us half solutions.  Millianism gets the modal profile issue right (sentence (1) and (2) express 
propositions with the same modal profile) but clashes with the intuition that sentences (1) and (2) 
express different propositions and it fails to explain the difference in their cognitive value.  
Descriptivism explains the difference in cognitive value but has the unwanted consequence that (1) and 
(2) have different modal profiles.36  Furthermore, Descriptivism implausibly posits that names have 
fixed cross-speaker descriptive meanings, whereas the TIUT does not (on the TIUT the meaning of 
names is their character, since names are indexicals).  The TIUT gives us everything we seek from our 
theory: cognitive value differences between uninformative and informative identity sentences that are 
                                                 
36 At least on a non-rigidified Descriptivism (and the weight of Kripke’s arguments, taken together, show rigidified 




explained by their expressing different propositions with the same modal profile.  The TIUT explains 
how ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ can be devoid of descriptive content, both rigidly refer to Kent-
Super, and at the same time differ in semantic content, contributing different conceptions to the 
proposition expressed (by way of contributing different dossier types, individuated by different 





2.7 Solution to Frege’s Puzzle about Propositional Attitude Ascriptions 
 
According to the TIUT, there are two sorts of propositional attitude ascriptions: those in which 
Millian names occur within the scope of the ‘that’-clause, and those in which Conception-indicating 
names occur in the scope of the ‘that’-clause.  In the former case, we have ‘Millian Ascriptions.’ A 
Millian ascription relates the ascribee to a singular proposition and is silent about how either the 
ascriber or the ascribee conceives the referent(s) of the name(s) in the ‘that’-clause. In the latter case, 
we have ‘Conception-indicating Ascriptions.’  A Conception-indicating ascription relates the 
ascribee to a singular proposition and, additionally, conveys the way in which the ascribee conceives 
the referent of the proper name inside the ‘that’-clause.  Conception-indicating ascriptions express a 
more finely-grained picture of the proposition the agent believes than Millian ascriptions.   
I do not believe there could be any non-arbitrary answer to the question: which sort of 
ascription really ascribes belief?  On the contrary, I think that both Conception-indicating and Millian 
ascriptions are used to ascribe belief, the salient difference between them being the level of how fine-
grained they are. Millian ascriptions are coarser-grained than Conception-indicating ascriptions 
because they merely indicate the singular propositions the ascribee believes without indicating the 
ascribee’s conception of the name’s referent.  Conception-indicating ascriptions are finer-grained 





Whether a particular propositional attitude ascription is a Millian or Conception-indicating 
ascription is a function of the speaker’s expressive intent in uttering the ascription sentence (although, 
as I elaborate below in section 2.7.2 infra, there are important pragmatic constraints on what the 
speaker can rationally intend to communicate to his audience via his or her utterance given what the 
audience is likely to take the utterance to mean in the context).  That is to say, propositional attitude 
ascriptions are semantically ambiguous between Millian and Conception-indicating readings, and to 
determine whether a particular propositional attitude ascription is due a Millian or Conception-
indicating reading, the audience must ascertain the proposition the speaker intended to convey to 
his/her audience (although, again, context will generally provide highly reliable clues to the speaker’s 
expressive intent).   
    
2.7.1  Conception-Indicating Ascriptions 
Consider propositional attitude ascription sentence (4), in which a speaker, Olson, uses the 
names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in a Conception-indicating way. 
 
(4)  Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman 
 
According to the TIUT, sentence (4), if uttered by Olson (supposing he uttered the sentence knowing it 
to express a falsehood), would express the false proposition that would be expressed by (4)†: 
 
(4)†          Lois believes that the subject individuating DCK is the subject individuating DSM  
 
  
where DCK is the dossier type instantiated by Olson’s dossier token that has Kent-Super as subject and 
a Clark Kent-y conception and from whose label he draws ‘Clark Kent,’ and DSM is the dossier type 




and from whose label Olson draws ‘Superman.’  
Likewise, suppose that Olson used the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in a Conception-
indicating way in ascription sentences (5) and (6).  
 
(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies 
 (6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies 
 
 
In uttering sentence (5), Olson would express the false proposition that would be expressed by (5)†, 
and in uttering (6) he would express the true proposition that would be expressed by (6)†.37  
 
(5)†     Lois believes that the subject individuating DCK flies   
 
(6)†     Lois believes that the subject individuating DSM flies   
 
 
4-s, 5-s, and 6-s, below, schematize the semantics (i.e., state the truth conditions) of the 
propositions Olson expresses by uttering sentence (4)-(6) (indicated de re vis-à-vis Kent-Super): 
4-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois’ dossier token d1 instantiating the same dossier 
type, DCK, as instantiated by Olson’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier token d2 from whose label 
Olson draws the name ‘Clark Kent,’ and Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois’ 
dossier token d3 instantiating the same dossier type, DSM, as instantiated by the Olson’s 
‘Superman’-labeled dossier token d4 from whose label Olson draws the name ‘Superman,’ and 
Believes (Lois, <<the subject of d1, the subject of d3>, identity >) 
 
5-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois’ dossier token d1 instantiating the same dossier  
type, DCK, as instantiated by Olson’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier token d2 from whose label 
Olson draws the name ‘Clark Kent,’ and Believes (Lois, <the subject of d1, flies>) 
 
6-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois’ dossier token d3 instantiating the same dossier 
type, DSM, as instantiated by Olson’s ‘Superman’-labeled dossier token d4 from whose label 
Olson draws the name ‘Superman,’ and Believes (Lois, <the subject of d3, flies>) 
 
 
The above schematization of the semantics of the proposition expressed by sentence (4) makes plain 
                                                 
37 Of course, Olson would not ordinarily utter either sentence (4) or (5), unless he intends to lie or mislead, because he 
realizes that both are false. Nevertheless, I am supposing here that Olson utters (4) and (5) in order to examine their 
semantics. By examining the semantics of the true (3) and contrasting it with the semantics of false (4), and by examining 
the semantics of false (5) and contrasting it with the semantics of the true (6), I aim to show that the Millians’ claim that (3) 




why (4) would express a false proposition.  Lois does not realize that her two dossiers tokens, d1 and 
d3, have the same subject.  In fact, she disbelieves that they have same subject.  Hence, she believes 
(erroneously) that the dossier types, DCK and DSM, instantiated by her tokens, d1 and d3, are 
individuated by different subjects.   
The above schematization of the semantics of (5) and (6) reveal that they genuinely differ in 
truth-value. (5) expresses a false proposition and (6) a true proposition.  (5) and (6) do not merely 
appear differ in truth-value as Millians maintain.  Whereas Lois does not believe that the subject of her 
dossier d1 flies, she does believe that the subject of her dossier d3 flies. Hence, (5) expresses the false 
proposition that Lois believes that the subject individuating dossier type DCK, which is the dossier type 
instantiated by her dossier tokens d1, flies.  And (6) expresses the true proposition that Lois believes 
that the subject individuating dossier type DSM, which is the dossier type instantiated by her dossier 
tokens d3, flies.    
In ascribing beliefs to Lois, Olson has in his mind a model of Lois’ mental architecture.  He 
aims to have a ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier token and a ‘Superman’-labeled dossier token that are of 
the same dossier types as Lois’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled and ‘Superman’-labeled dossier tokens 
respectively.  Olson ascribes beliefs to Lois by referencing his own dossier tokens qua tokens of the 
same types as Lois’s tokens. Below is a (metaphorical) description of the nature of Olson’s ascription 
sentence (5n)  
 
(5n)  Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent flies 
 
from Olson’s first person perspective:   
 
There is a dossier token in Lois’ mental architecture which is an instance of the dossier type of 
which this dossier token is a token [Olson makes his own ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier token 
salient by drawing the name ‘Clark Kent’ from that dossier token’s label]; Lois does NOT 
believe that the subject of her dossier token, instantiating the same type as the token from 





Below is a (metaphorical) description of the nature of Olson’s ascription sentence (6), from Olson’s 
first person perspective:   
 
There is a dossier token in Lois’ mental architecture which is an instance of the dossier type of 
which this dossier token is a token [Olson makes his own ‘Superman’-labeled dossier token 
salient by drawing the name ‘Superman’ from that dossier token’s label]; Lois believes that the 
subject of her dossier token, instantiating the same dossier type as the token from whose label I 
am drawing the name ‘Superman,’ flies.    
 
On the TIUT, (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) express different propositions with different truth-values.  
Sentence (3) expresses the trivial proposition that Lois believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super due to 
the Millian use of both of the proper names in the ‘that’-clause of (3).  A rational Lois Lane could 
never disbelieve the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause of (3).  But the semantics of (4), as I 
have schematized them above, make clear, the ‘that’-clause of (4) refers to a different proposition from 
that of (3).  Lois Lane can rationally disbelieve the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause in (4).  
She may rationally do so because she fails to realize that her two dossier tokens, d1 and d3, have the 
same subject.  Furthermore, she can rationally disbelieve the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-
clause in (5) and believe the proposition referred to by ‘that’-clause in (6), because she is ignorant of 
the fact that her dossier tokens d1 and d3 have the same subject.  She may rationally, and without 
inconsistency, believe that the subject of d1 does not fly and believe that the subject of d3 does fly.  
 One final point here.  The reader may wonder why the Conception-indicating character appeals 
to dossier types, rather than just to dossier tokens.  To see why types, rather than tokens, are necessary, 
consider the following example. Suppose a man named ‘Tony’ knows a lot about Lois Lane, but Lois 
has never heard about Tony or met him and does not know him from Adam.  Now suppose Tony were 
to utter propositional attitude ascription ¬ (5) 
 





and suppose further that the content of ‘Clark Kent’ were given by the definite description the subject 
of dossier token dCK,Tony, where dCK,Tony is a dossier token in Tony’s head that has Kent-Super as 
subject and a Clark Kent-y conception.  Sentence  ¬ (5), as uttered by Tony, would therefore express 
the same proposition as the sentence ‘Lois Lane disbelieves the subject of dossier token dCK,Tony flies.’  
This sentence makes a claim about Lois’ belief about the properties of a particular dossier token in 
Tony’s head, dCK,Tony.  The crux of the difficulty is that Lois’ belief that Clark Kent does not fly is not 
a belief about Tony’s dossier token dCK,Tony, and Lois Lane does not even know who Tony is, so she 
can hardly entertain beliefs about his dossier tokens.  But this problem is avoided by the TIUT because 
the Conception-indicating character refers to dossier types:  Lois Lane does indeed have beliefs about 
dossier types in virtue of having beliefs about her own dossier tokens, which instantiate dossier types.  
Because Tony can have a dossier token of the same type as Lois’ token, he can “point to” his token as 
an instance of the type and say that Lois has a belief about the type by virtue of her having a belief 
about a token of that type in her head.  The truth-value of the proposition Tony expresses does not 
depend in any way on whether Lois has any beliefs about Tony’s dossier tokens. It depends only on 
her having tokens of the same type as his tokens and having beliefs about her own tokens.  She need 
not be familiar with Tony or be capable or entertaining thought about his dossier tokens in order for 
Tony to truly ascribe beliefs to Lois with respect to Clark Kent’s flying ability (or lack thereof).   
To summarize: if the Conception-indicting character were phrased in terms of tokens rather 
than types, propositional attitude ascriptions would be overly “autobiographical,” as it were: a speaker, 
such as Tony, in ascribing belief to an ascribee such as Lois Lane, would be making a claim about his 
own dossier tokens—asserting that Lois has beliefs about his tokens.   But when Tony ascribes belief 
to Lois about whether she thinks Clark Kent flies, he is not talking about himself or his dossier tokens 





2.7.2   Millian Ascriptions  
 Some propositional attitude ascriptions contain Millian names and such ascriptions report belief 
between agents and singular propositions. If, when someone uttered sentence (3),   
 
 (3)  Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent 
 
s/he were to use the name ‘Clark Kent’ in a Millian way (for both occurrences in (3)), s/he would 
express the proposition that Lois believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super.   For the content of each 
occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ would, according to the Millian character, be Kent-Super himself.    
If, when someone uttered sentence (6), s/he were to use the name ‘Superman’ in a Millian way, 
s/he would express a true proposition.   
 
(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies 
 
Lois believes the singular proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause of (6)—that Kent-Super flies, for 
she believes Kent-Super that he flies when she thinks of him under a Superman-y conception.   So (6) 
is true when ‘Superman’ is used in it in a Millian way.  As I argued in section 2.7.1 supra, (6) would 
also be true if the speaker used the name ‘Superman’ in (6) in a Conception-indicating way, except the 
proposition expressed would be different, as set out in section 2.7.1 (it would be a finer-grained 
ascription, indicating the ascribee’s Superman-y conception of Kent-Super.)   
In the case of sentence (5), however, truth-value depends crucially on whether the ascriber uses 
the name ‘Clark Kent’ in a Millian or Conception-indicating way. 
   
(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies 
 
As I argued in section 2.7.1, consistent with intuitions about the matter, (5) is false when ‘Clark Kent’ 




conceives him in a Clark Kent-y way. When she conceives Kent-Super in a Clark Kent-y way, she 
very much is convinced that he cannot fly.  But suppose that someone uttered sentence (5) intending to 
use the name ‘Clark Kent’ in a Millian way, just to refer Kent-Super.  The content of ‘Clark Kent’ 
would be Kent-Super, the man himself.  Hence, the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause of the 
ascription, ‘that Clark Kent flies,’ would be the singular proposition that Kent-Super flies.  Lois does in 
fact believe this singular proposition (for she believes it when she conceives Kent-Super as Superman), 
so (5) is true when ‘Clark Kent’ is used in a Millian way, even though it is false when used in 
Conception-indicating way.  
It might seem quite surprising that I would maintain that (5) could be used to express a true 
proposition, since we tend to have the strong intuition that (5) is false, period.  However, I think this 
intuition is unreliable.  We have this intuition because neither we, nor any enlightened speaker (such as 
Olson), would ever utter (5) qua Millian ascription because of the fact that we know about Lois’ 
confusion about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman.  An utterance of (5) as a Millian ascription 
(to express the proposition that Lois believes that Kent-Super flies) would be highly misleading to our 
target audience.  Upon hearing a speaker uttering (5), an audience would presume that the speaker is 
saying that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super can fly when she thinks of him under a Clark Kent-y 
conception, as a mild-mannered reporter (i.e., the false proposition that (5) would express were it a 
Conception-indicating ascription).  However, before we judge all utterances of (5) to express a false 
proposition full stop, we must consider what a speaker knows about Lois Lane’s confusion and what 
sort of expressive intent he has. Consider a scenario in which an enlightened speaker—call him 
“Kurt”—is unaware that Lois Lane, or anyone in Metropolis, is unenlightened about the identity of 
Clark Kent and Superman.  Kurt knows that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are both names for Kent-
Super, but he does not realize that different conceptions are commonly associated with the names by 




sentence (5) merely to report that Lois Lane believes of Kent-Super, de re, that he can fly, without 
concern for (or knowledge of) the different ways in which she conceives him.   To determine whether 
what Kurt said is true or false when uttering (5), I believe one must ask the following questions: what 
proposition did Kurt intend to express with his utterance, and given what he knew (or failed to know) 
about his audience, was it reasonable for him to utter (5) to communicate that proposition?  Given that 
Kurt is unaware of Lois’ unenlightened state and he intended to use ‘Clark Kent’ just to refer to Kent-
Super, it was reasonable for him to utter (5) to express the de re proposition that Lois believes that 
Kent-Super flies. Kurt has expressed, via uttering (5), the true proposition that Lois Lane believes the 
singular proposition that Kent-Super flies. However, his utterance is pragmatically deficient as it is 
highly misleading given Lois’ confused state of mind and given the audience he is addressing who 
knows about her confusion.  That Kurt has not spoken falsely, strictly speaking, is evidenced by the 
fact that ordinary enlightened speakers aware of Kurt’s ignorance of Lois’ confused state probably 
would not correct Kurt by uttering merely ‘that is false; she does not believe he can fly.’ Realizing that 
Kurt intends to say something true but is saying it in a misleading way, they would instead correct him 
by saying something like: ‘Well Kurt, she does believe the guy can fly, but not when she thinks of him 
as Clark Kent, but only when she thinks of him as Superman, since she does not realize Clark Kent and 
is Superman.’  In other words, Kurt’s audience can understand Kurt’s utterance as a (technically true) 
Millian ascription if they are able to put themselves into Kurt’s shoes and interpret his utterance from 
his epistemic perspective.  
We may have difficulty interpreting ‘Clark Kent’ as a Millian name—one used just to refer to 
Kent-Super and not to pick out Kent-Super under a mild-mannered reporter conception—precisely 
because it is so commonly used as a Conception-indicating name in the Superman story.  The names 
‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ have each come to mean a certain individual under a certain conception 




acting a like a regular weak earthling.  ‘Superman’ has come to mean Kent-Super dressed in a super-
hero costume and acting like a superhero.  Each name is so strongly associated with a particular 
conception that the ability to use these names without immediately calling to mind the intimately 
associated conceptions has become weakened. Therefore, we have difficulty seeing that either of those 
names could be used in a strictly Millian way, i.e., just to refer to Kent-Super, they guy himself, 
without calling to mind a way of conceiving him.  But not every Frege’s puzzle case involves 
conceptions conventionally associated with proper names. Let us consider a Frege’s puzzle case in 
which we do not strongly conventionally associate certain conceptions with a pair of co-referential 
proper names, where the conceptions are instead associated with the names only in the confines of a 
particular idiosyncratic conversational context. Suppose that you are standing on the street with your 
friend, Bob.  Barack Obama walks by, and Bob utters: “Wow, I haven’t seen Barry in ages. He sure is 
looking handsome.”  Later that day, you report to me: “Bob thinks Obama is looking handsome.”  This 
propositional attitude ascription seems clearly true.  Now, suppose you find out the following day that 
that Bob is a childhood friend of Barack Obama, but he only knew him by the name “Barry” as a child. 
Bob is unaware that Barry, his childhood friend, is Barack Obama, the president of the Unites States. 
Bob knows that the president of the US is named “Barack Obama” and knows a lot about his policies 
but somehow does not know what Obama looks like.  When Obama walked by, Bob only recognized 
him as his childhood friend, Barry, not as the president of the US, Barack Obama.  Query: now that 
you have found out about Bob’s confusion, do you deem the propositional attitude ascription you 
uttered the previous day, “Bob thinks Obama is handsome,” to have been true or false?  My intuition 
here is that the ascription was true and remains so despite what you learn about Bob’s idiosyncratic 
confused state and despite the fact that Bob might dissent from the sentence “Obama is handsome,” 
since Bob has never seen Obama in the guise of president of the US.  When you uttered the ascription 




were not taking into consideration Bob’s conception or conceptions of Obama.  It seems fine to report 
Bob’s beliefs about how Obama looks now using the name “Obama”, even though Bob would not use 
this name, because Bob’s two conceptions of the man, one he associated with the name ‘Barry’ and the 
other with the name ‘Obama’, are idiosyncratic to Bob and have not become conventionalized amongst 
a wide swath of the language community.    
In sum, I think the intuition that sentence (5) expresses a false proposition full stop, irrespective 
of the speaker’s expressive intentions in uttering the name or what the speaker knew or failed to know 
about conceptions associated with the name, is erroneous, and it arises from the peculiarity of the 
Kent/Superman case, i.e., the fact that conceptions have become strongly conventionally associated 
with the names.   In Frege’s puzzle cases like the Barry/Obama case, where different conceptions are 
associated with the names ‘Barry’ and ‘Obama’ only within the confines of a particular conversational 
context, we are more inclined to accept that the name ‘Obama’ could be used in a Millian way just to 
refer to the man himself, and would not automatically evoke any particular conception of the man.  
Both Millian and Conception-indicating readings of (5) are possible.  On the Millian reading, 
the sentence is true. On the Conception-indicating reading it is false.  The speaker’s expressive intent is 
the main factor determining whether the tokening of a name is owed a Millian or Conception-
indicating reading. One might then wonder therefore whether a speaker could token the names ‘Clark 
Kent’ and ‘Superman’ side by side inside the ‘that’-clause of a propositional attitude ascription 
intending a Millian reading of both names.  For example, could an ascriber use the names ‘Clark Kent’ 
and ‘Superman’ in a Millian way inside the ‘that’-clause of ascription sentence (4) to express the true 
but trivial proposition that Lois believes PROP-1, that Kent-Super is Kent-Super? 
 
  (4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman 
      




conversation that could perhaps be construed as a corollary of Grice’s Maxim of Manner (i.e., be as 
clear, as brief, and as orderly as one can, avoid obscurity and ambiguity), explains why no ascriber 
would use the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in (4) in a Millian way to express the trivial (and 
true) proposition that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super.  
 
Meaning Consistency: Multiple occurrences of the same syntactic string in a sentence 
generally entail that the speaker meant the same thing by each occurrence.38  Occurrences of 
different syntactic strings entail a difference in meaning. 
  
When any audience hears an utterance of (4), it presumes, according the Meaning Consistency 
Principle, that the expressions ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are non-synonymous.  
After all, the speaker surely must have a reason for using two different names. The audience would 
never understand the names to be used in a Millian way, because this would involve using the names 
synonymously (since each of their semantic contents would be the same—Kent-Super himself and 
nothing more). Every rational speaker would realize that his audience would not read the names as 
Millian names, and hence s/he would understand that his or her audience would misunderstand him if 
he uttered (4) with the intention to use both the names in a Millian way to say that Lois Lane believes 
the trivial proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super.  Perhaps I would go as far as to say that no 
rational ascriber could utter (4) to express this proposition, knowing that the proposition would be 
universally misunderstood.  For what a speaker may express via an utterance is not merely a function 
of the expressive intent of the speaker, but in addition, it is constrained by what the speaker can 
reasonably expect his audience to take it to mean.39 And pragmatic principles of conversation, such as 
                                                 
38
 By generally, I mean that there are exceptions when the conversational context makes it clear that the speaker means 
different things by the same expression (see Bill/Liz example, section 2.8 infra), or where the grammar of the sentence 
entails a difference in meaning (e.g., in the sentence “Rose in popularity beginning in high school” we infer from the 
grammar that the two occurrences of “rose” must have different meanings). 
   
39 It is also unlikely that the audience would read the sentence as a Millian ascription (to say that Lois Lane believes that 
Kent-Super is self-identical) simply because practically no one except a logician or a philosopher would ever discuss self-




the meaning consistency principle, control here.  Hence, whether a proper name is due a Millian or 
Conception-indicating reading is a function of speaker expressive intent constrained by pragmatic 
principles that guide speakers in their choice of words.  Without doing violence to the language, 
speakers cannot intend to mean something by their words when they know that pragmatic guiding 
principles of language interpretation will prevent their message from getting across.40 
 
 
2.8    Solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief 
 
In uttering (8) and ¬ (7), Lois Lane would express and believe inconsistent singular 
propositions, assuming that she uses the names in a Millian way in her utterances.  
 
(8) Superman flies 
¬ (7) Clark Kent does not fly 
 
As discussed in sections 1.2 and 2.1, she would use the names in a Millian way since she does not 
realize that she has two different conceptions of the one Kent-Super, and so she would have no reason 
to refer to those conceptions or make them salient in uttering (8) and ¬ (7) by using names in a 
Conception-indicating way.  Sentences (8) and ¬ (7), where the names are used in a Millian way, 
would express the inconsistent singular propositions that Kent-Super flies and that it is not the case 
that Kent-Super flies.   
 As described above in section 1.2, the problem of rational inconsistent belief challenges us to 
explain why Lois Lane is not to be charged with irrationality because of her having inconsistent 
                                                                                                                                                                       
  
40 I do not mean to suggest that it would be impossible to create an artificial language that did not follow the Meaning 
Consistency rule. In such a language, (4) would have a possible reading on which it merely stated that Lois believes that 
Kent-Super is Kent-Super.  But my concern here is explaining natural language in actual use.  Such an artificial language 
would be far more unwieldy and full of ambiguity than natural language, since the audience would not be able to tell 
whether the speaker uttered (4) to say that Lois believes someone is self-identical or to say that Clark Kent and Superman 




beliefs.  To solve the problem, we have to figure out what Lois is ignorant of, and then show that it is 
this ignorance, rather than irrationality, that explains her holding inconsistent beliefs.   
An agent who believes/expresses inconsistent singular propositions is irrational only if he or 
she does so knowingly.   That is, an agent is irrational only if either s/he believes/expresses singular 
propositions that s/he knows to be inconsistent, or s/he is in an epistemic position such that s/he may 
infer that the propositions are inconsistent, and believes them anyway.  Modern proponents of 
Millianism such as, e.g., Nathan Salmon, have a somewhat similar approach: they generally posit that 
Lois Lane is not irrational in expressing the inconsistent singular propositions that Kent-Super flies and 
that Kent-Super does not fly because she takes the proposition under different “propositional guises” 
such that she does not realize (and is not in a position to infer) that the singular propositions she 
express when uttering (8) and ¬ (7) are inconsistent (see David Shier, Chapter 6.7 “Propositional 
Attitude Reports” in Russell, Gillian, The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 
London: Routledge, 2012, page 801, for discussion of propositional guises or “ways of taking 
propositions”).41  On the TIUT, the key to explaining why Lois is not in an epistemic position to infer 
                                                 
41 Millians who invoke the notion of propositional guises hold that belief is a binary relation between an agent and a 
(singular) proposition.  However, the relation is mediated: agents do not directly believe those singular propositions—they 
believe them via a propositional guise.  An agent believes a proposition in virtue of standing in some psychological relation 
to the propositional guise.  The nature of the psychological relation depends on what guises are, and this varies from one 
theory to another. In fact, all Millian theories are notoriously vague about what propositional guises are. If guises were 
claimed to be propositions, then the psychological relation would be belief.  If propositional guises were claimed to be 
natural language sentences, sentence-like entities, mental representations in an internal code, or belief states, rather than 
propositions, then the psychological relation would not be belief, but some other psychological relation (since belief is 
strictly the psychological relation between agents and propositions). Because of the propositional guise under which Lois 
believes the proposition expressed by (2) when presented by (2) she fails to fully grasp the nature of the proposition it 
expresses. She is partially ignorant about the properties and constituents of the proposition she believes. She can ‘see’ only 
the guise under which she takes the proposition, and she cannot ‘see’ the proposition behind the guise.  A proposition could 
be presented under different guises to an agent, who might assent towards or accept as true the proposition under one guise, 
but not under the other. Here, the agent would fail to realize that the same proposition is presented twice over in different 
ways.  In Salmon’s terminology (1989, 261), Lois Lane suffers from “propositional recognition failure” because she fails to 
recognize a proposition when presented under one propositional guise as a proposition she already believes but under a 
different propositional guise.  When PROP-1 is presented by the sentence (1) she recognizes the proposition as something 
she believes; but when the same proposition is presented by (2) she fails to see that it expresses the same proposition.  
Salmon (1986) likens propositional recognition failure to the failure to recognize a familiar individual.  For example, I 
might meet my mother on the street and not recognize her if she is wearing a mask. It would be inaccurate to say that I do 
not recognize my mother tout court.  We want to say instead that I recognize her when she appears to me in some ways, and 
I can fail to recognize her when she appears to me in some other ways.   Likewise, you can be familiar with a proposition, 




that she expresses inconsistent singular propositions is to be found in the indexical nature of proper 
names.  She does not know that the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ have the same reference 
because she does not know that the dossiers labeled with this names and from whose labels she draws 
those names have the same subject.  She does not knowingly express inconsistent propositions because 
she does not realize that the propositions expressed are inconsistent, and this is because she is 
(partially) ignorant about the propositions she expresses; to wit, she is partially ignorant about the 
contents of the proper names in the context.  She would be irrational only if she believed inconsistent 
propositions while realizing them to be inconsistent.   
The indexical nature of proper names explains how an agent is capable of expressing a 
proposition while being partially ignorant of the content of a proper name in a sentence he or she 
utters.  As John Perry (1979) and David Kaplan (1989) have stressed in their important work on 
indexicals, an (automatic) indexical is such that the agent uttering the indexical in a particular context 
need only grasp the character of the indexical in order to load the content of the indexical in a context 
into a proposition.  The agent may be ignorant of the content loaded into the proposition s/he 
expresses.  For example, suppose I look out my window on April 1, 2014, see that it is sunny out, and 
utter “today is a sunny day.”  The indexical expression ‘today’ automatically loads April 1, 2014 into 
the proposition.  I have thus expressed the proposition that April 1, 2014 is a sunny day even if I am 
under the mistaken belief that the date is April 2, 2014 when I utter the sentence.  My ignorance of the 
content of the indexical—my erroneous belief about the content of ‘today’ given the context I am in—
                                                                                                                                                                       
differently, in which case you might dissent from certain sentences expressing it.  You are unable to discern the contents of 
the proposition clearly because of the propositional guise under which you take the proposition.  
Note that the TIUT appeals to a notion similar to propositional guises to explain why rational agents such as Lois 
Lane can rationally believe inconsistent propositions, such as the singular propositions that Kent-Super can fly and the 
singular proposition that Kent-Super cannot fly.  Lois Lane does not recognize that (7) and (8)  
 
(7) Clark Kent flies 
(8) Superman flies 
 
express the same singular proposition (but only when the speaker uses the names in a Millian way).  She suffers from 
Salmon’s propositional recognition failure.  This propositional recognition failure is explained in terms of the indexical 




does not alter the fact that I expressed a proposition about April 1 and not April 2.  By using indexicals 
in a sentence, be they indexicals such as ‘today’ or proper names (which the TIUT claims are also 
indexicals), the content of the propositions an agent expresses may be masked or hidden from the 
agent.  The content is automatically loaded into the proposition even if the speaker has erroneous 
beliefs about it or is ignorant about it. An agent using a proper name as an indexical in a sentence may 
therefore be partially ignorant about or have false believes with respect to the proposition he expresses 
when uttering the sentence.42  It is this ignorance, not irrationality, which explains the agent’s 
expressing (and believing) inconsistent propositions.43   
Millians cannot appeal to the indexical nature of proper names to solve the problem of rational 
inconsistent belief, as the TIUT does.  According to standard Millianism, there is nothing more to the 
meaning of a proper name apart from its referent.  The Millian denies that proper names have a 
character meaning, as the TIUT maintains.  Millians instead appeal to the notion of propositional 
guises or ways of taking propositions to explain how agents can be (partially) ignorant of the contents 
of the propositions they believe.44  But Millians have never specified exactly what these propositional 
guises or ways of taking propositions are.   The TIUT, by contrast, gives us a concrete and specific 
                                                 
42
 Nathan Salmon (1986) also stresses this point: agents may express and believe propositions while at the same time being 
partially ignorant of their constituents.  They may therefore simultaneously believe a proposition and its negation without 
being irrational, since their ignorance of the constituents of the propositions blinds them to their inconsistency. 
    
43 An enlightened agent, by contrast with an unenlightened agent such as Lois Lane, cannot rationally accept (7) and ¬ (8) 
or (1) and ¬ (2), for an enlightened agent would realize that the names co-refer, and s/he either draws both names from the 
same dossier’s label (a dossier labeled with both names) or draws the names from distinct differently-labeled dossiers, but 
realizes that the dossiers have the same subject.  The use of the proper names as indexicals does not mask the structure or 
nature of the proposition for an enlightened agent because the enlightened agent’s different mental architecture (i.e., 
different dossier structures) places him/her in a distinct epistemic position giving him/her access to information about the 
nature and structure of the propositions expressed that the unenlightened agent lacks.  
 
44
 See Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998, 308-310) for an argument that construing proper names as indexicals would solve the 
problem of rational inconsistent belief.  Their theory of names as indexicals is substantially different from that of the TIUT, 
for theirs does not invoke mental dossiers, nor does it provide that names can be used in ways in which they communicate 
conceptions.  On their theory, proper names have character meanings, and their contents are always their referents, full stop.  
Therefore, their theory is a species of Millianism that differs from standard Millianism owing to their positing that proper 
names have character meaning.  As a species of Millianism, the theory has the same difficulty in explaining the cognitive 
values and truth-value differences arising in Frege’s puzzles, even if it has an advantage over other forms of Millianism in 




story explaining how an agent might believe a proposition while being ignorant about some of the 
constituents of the proposition.  Again, the key is the indexicality of proper names.    
 The problem of rational inconsistent belief does not arise on the TIUT in the case of 
enlightened speakers such as Olson when they ascribe belief.  According to the TIUT (as discussed 
supra in section 2.7.1), (3) and (4) express different propositions (qua Conception-Indicating 
ascriptions), with the consequence that an ascriber who uttered (3) and the negation of (4), (4n), would 
not be inconsistent.  By contrast, according to Millianism, (3) and (4) express the same proposition and 
(3) and (4n) express inconsistent propositions. The Millian claim that the enlightened Olson would be 
inconsistent in uttering (3) and (4n) amounts to a reductio of Millianism.  Olson is not ignorant the 
identity or Clark Kent and Superman and fully grasps Lois’ confused epistemic state.  Millians cannot 
point out what Olson fails to realize to explain why he is inconsistent.  This suggests that the only 
explanation for Olson’s inconsistency is irrationality.  But Olson is not irrational.  In uttering (3) and 
(4n) he does what any rational ordinary speaker would do. Even die-hard Millians would utter (3) and 
(4n) to ascribe belief to Lois when they are not wearing their philosopher hats.  The Millian claim that 
(3) and (4n) are inconsistent is implausible because Millians can offer no reasonable explanation as to 
why a rational Olson would knowingly make these inconsistent statements. This strongly suggests that 
(3) and (4n) are not inconsistent after all, meaning that (3) and (4) do not express the same proposition 




2.9 Informative Identities without Substitution  
 
 In the literature on Frege’s puzzle about informative identity sentences, it is often assumed sub 
silentio that tautological-looking sentences such as (1) always express uninformative identities. 
 





This assumption goes back to Frege’s characterization of the identity sentences puzzle as he stated in 
in On Sense and Reference.  There, Frege posed the question why sentences of the form a=a were 
uninformative and one could tell them to be true just by inspection of their syntactic form, whereas 
sentences of the form a=b were informative and one could not tell them to be true or false merely by 
inspecting their syntactic form.  The assumption that sentences of the form a=a can be determined to 
be true merely by inspection goes for logic, but not for natural language sentences.  The TIUT 
recognizes the fact that a natural language sentence of the form a=a, such as sentence (1), could 
express either an informative or uninformative identity. It depends on the speaker’s expressive intent. 
On their own sentences do not express propositions; it is speakers who use sentences to do so.  On the 
TIUT, sentence (1) would express an informative identity if the first and second occurrences of ‘Clark 
Kent’ corresponded to two distinct ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier tokens in the speaker’s mind 
containing different conceptions, and the speaker intended the name ‘Clark Kent’ in a Conception-
indicating way for both occurrences.  I have discussed an example of (1) as an informative identity 
supra in section 1.2—the case of Tom who meets a man named Clark Kent at a party and suspects he  
is the same Clark Kent with whom he went to Kindergarten in Smallville.  Or consider Kripke’s 
Paderewski case discussed above in section 2.1. A man named ‘Peter’ might say ‘Paderewski the 
pianist has musical talent, but Paderewski the politician surely does not,’ failing to realize that the 
pianist and the politician are the same person. Someone might say to Peter ‘But Peter, Paderewski is 
Paderewski’ to inform him that Paderewski the politician is the same person as Paderewski the 
musician. Here, ‘… Paderewski is Paderewski’ is used to express an informative proposition and not to 
point out the trivial fact that Paderewski is self-identical.  The tokenings of ‘Paderewski’ allude to 
difference conceptions of the man—one the conception of a pianist and the other of a politician. For 
another example of (1) as an informative identity, consider the following scenario: Bill and Liz, a 




and Liz have met Clark Kent on several occasions.  On each occasion, Bill and Liz have conceived 
Clark Kent as being their next-door neighbor and a reporter by profession.  One day, Bill and Liz are at 
a party and meet a man who introduces himself as ‘Clark Kent,’ but he claims that he is a resident of 
Hoboken and a mechanic by trade.  He denies ever having lived in Brooklyn, denies ever having 
worked as a reporter, or being Bill and Liz’ neighbor.  Yet this Clark Kent (from the party) looks and 
sounds identical to the other Clark Kent (the neighbor).  Bill and Liz suspect that this Clark Kent at the 
party is in fact the neighbor pretending to be someone else.  Bill now wants to convey to Liz his belief 
that the Brooklyn resident reporter, their neighbor, is the Hoboken mechanic. To do this, Bill utters 
sentence (1) to Liz, ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent.’  Here, Bill uses (1) as an informative identity sentence 
to inform Liz that he believes that the Clark they have met at the party is Clark Kent, their neighbor.  
Here is what is going on, according to the TIUT, when Bill utters (1).  Bill first entertains a dossier 
token labeled ‘Clark Kent’ that contains the conceptual representations named Clark Kent and lives in 
Hoboken, is a mechanic, met him at a party.  Let us call the dossier type instantiated by Bill’s dossier 
token ‘DCK1.’  He draws the name ‘Clark Kent’ from the dossier’s label (he utters ‘Clark Kent’).  With 
the second occurrence of ‘Clark Kent,’ he entertains a different dossier token, also labeled ‘Clark Kent’ 
and containing the representations named Clark Kent and lives in Brooklyn, is a reporter, is our next-
door neighbor. Let us call the dossier type instantiated by Bill’s dossier token ‘DCK2.’ He draws the 
name ‘Clark Kent’ from the dossier token (he utters ‘Clark Kent’).  Bill has thereby expressed the 
informative identity proposition whose structure is revealed by sentence (1)INF†:  
 
(1)INF† The subject individuating DCK1 is the subject individuating DCK2  
 
Liz may then report Bill’s belief back to him by uttering (3^) as a Conception-indicating ascription. 
  





(3^)† below gives us a window onto the proposition expressed by Liz’ propositional attitude ascription 
(3^) (reporting that Bill believes (1)INF†):  
 
(3^)†  You (Bill) believe that the subject individuating DCK1 is the subject 
individuating DCK2    
 
 
The semantics of the proposition expressed by (3^)†, schematized in a de re way vis-à-vis Kent-Super, 
are set out in 3^-s below: 
 
3^-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Bill’s dossier token d1 instantiating 
the same dossier type, DCK1, as instantiated by Liz’ ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier token d2 
from whose label Liz draws ‘Clark Kent,’ and Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of 
Bill’s dossier token d3 instantiating the same dossier type, DCK2, as instantiated by Liz’ ‘Clark 
Kent’-labeled dossier token d4 from whose label Liz draws ‘Clark Kent,’ and Believes (Bill, 
<<the subject of d1, the subject of d3>, identity >) 
 
 Uttering sentence (1) is an effective way to express an informative identity, and uttering (3) is 
an effective way to express a Conception-indicating ascription, given the facts of this particular 
conversational setting described here where Bill and Liz are each aware of the different conceptions 
they each associate with the name ‘Clark Kent.’  In conversational contexts in which the different 
conceptions are not as salient to the conversational participants as in the one describe above, uttering 
(1) would not be effective in communicating an informative identity, and uttering (3) would not be an 
effective in communicating a Conception-indicating ascription.  The pragmatic ‘Meaning Consistency 
Principle,’ a corollary of Grice's Principle of Manner, discussed supra in section 2.7.2, explains why.  
 
Meaning Consistency:  Multiple occurrences of the same syntactic string in a sentence 
generally entail that the speaker meant the same thing by each occurrence.45 Occurrences of 
different syntactic strings entail a difference in meaning. 
 
                                                 
45
 By generally, I mean that there are exceptions when the conversational context makes it clear that the speaker means 
different things by the same expression (as in the Bill/Liz example), or where the grammar of the sentence entails a 
difference in meaning (e.g., in the sentence “Rose rose in popularity beginning in high school” we infer from the grammar 




According to the above Meaning Consistency Principle, speakers tend to avoid using ascriptions such 
as (1) or (3) (to express an informative identity or a Conception-indicating ascription, respectively), in 
general, because the repetition of the name ‘Clark Kent’ suggests that each occurrence of the name is 
synonymous.  Here, however, the tokenings of ‘Clark Kent’ are not intended to be synonymous.  The 
term “generally” in the above definition of Meaning Consistency indicates that there are exceptions to 
the general rule:  two uses of the same expression might be used to mean different things if the 
conversational context in which the sentence uttered would alert the audience to the fact that the 
speaker is using them to mean different things.  In cases such as Bill and Liz example, there is strong 
mutual knowledge between Liz and Bill regarding two different conceptions associated with the same 
lexical item—the name ‘Clark Kent,’ and these different conceptions are salient in the conversational 
context.   Hence, Bill and Liz are aware that two occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ might not mean the same 
thing in a sentence, overriding the general principle that syntactically identical strings are presumed to 
be synonymous.  Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Bill would utter ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ 
merely to point out the obvious fact that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. (The utterance would communicate 
no relevant information, violating Grice’s maxim of relation). Realizing this, Liz is naturally attuned to 
the possibility that the two occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ in Bill’s utterance are meant to be non-
synonymous.      
In conversational contexts in which this mutual knowledge is not as strong with respect to how 
the difference occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ could differ in meaning as here, the principle of meaning 
consistency would counsel that a speaker ought to use different names to correspond to the different 
conceptions in order to avoid ambiguity.  Where there is just one single name, ‘Clark Kent,’ as here, 
the speaker could coin partially descriptive names to refer to the same individual under different 
conceptions of him or her.  For example, a speaker might coin the partially descriptive names ‘Clark 




from the party is Clark our neighbor.’ Or a speaker might coin the partially descriptive names ‘Clark 
the reporter’ and ‘Clark the mechanic,’ so that the informative identity sentence would be: ‘Clark the 
reporter is Clark the mechanic.’  The use of these partially descriptive names avoids the potential 
ambiguity that might be occasioned by tokening ‘Clark Kent’ twice over and uttering ‘Clark Kent is 
Clark Kent.’ Furthermore, uttering ‘Clark from the party is Clark our neighbor’ or ‘Clark the reporter 
is Clark the mechanic’ to express the identity has the advantage that the audience is clued into the 
different conceptions the speaker has in his dossiers of the individual referred to, for the conceptions 
the speaker associates with the names are built directly into the partially descriptive names.               
 To summarize my discussion in this section, I maintain that (1) could be used to express an 
informative identity, and (3) to express a Conception-indicating ascription, where the conversational 
participants are aware of the different conceptions attached to the names by the speaker and the 
speaker and his audience mutually know that they are aware of the relevant conceptions in the 
context.46  The use of (1) to express an informative identity represents an exception to the Meaning 
Consistency Principle because the conversational participants in the conversational context can readily 
determine from contextual clues that the speaker likely does not mean the same thing by the two 
tokenings of ‘Clark Kent’—that the speaker is using the names in a Conception-indicating way—and 
can puzzle out the different conceptions associated with them from contextual clues. 
 
2.10 Informative Identities: A Priori or A Posteriori Propositions? 
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke claims that true informative identity sentences such as 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ or ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ express necessary a posteriori propositions. I 
agree with Kripke about the now rather uncontroversial claim that the propositions expressed are 
                                                 
46
 And conversely, using sentences like (1) or (3) will be disfavored by speaker on pragmatic grounds (because of the 
Meaning Consistency Principle) where there is uncertainty whether the conversational participants will realize that the 





necessary.47 However, in this section I shall argue, contra Kripke, that strictly speaking such identity 
sentences express necessary a priori propositions. After arguing this, I then go on to argue that there is 
also a “looser sense” in which we might say that such propositions are a posteriori.  However, in this 
looser sense the propositions are contingent.   
Kripke’s claim that the propositions expressed by true informative identity sentences are both 
necessary and a posteriori is controversial and it was considered revolutionary when he first made it in 
Naming and Necessity.  The standard view from the time of Kant through Kripke was that the 
necessary and the a priori were coextensive.  It was widely believed that no a posteriori proposition 
could be necessary, and no necessary proposition could be a posteriori.  
Kripke supports his claim that true informative identities express a posteriori propositions in 
two ways.  First, he appeals to our untutored intuitions that they are a posteriori.  Second, he offers a 
formal argument for his claim. The untutored intuition that they a posteriori seems prima facie 
compelling (although I shall argue that this intuition is ultimately erroneous).  The intuition suggests to 
us that Hesperus’ identity with Phosphorus (they are both names of the planet Venus) or that Clark 
Kent’s identity with Superman cannot be discovered by armchair reflection; one would have to observe 
something empirically to find out that these identities are true. The fact that the Astronomer who 
discovered that Hesperus and Phosphorus were the same celestial body used astronomical 
investigation, not pure mathematics or logic, to make the discovery, seems to militate in favor of the 
view that the proposition that Hesperus is Phosphorus is a posteriori. And so does the fact that Lois 
Lane does not discover that Clark Kent is Superman merely through reflection, but rather only via 
empirical evidence such as seeing Clark Kent changing into his Superman outfit or catching Kent-
Super dressed as Clark Kent bending a bar of steel, or being told about the identity by Olson. As 
compelling as the intuition may be that the propositions expressed by these informative identities are a 
                                                 
47 That informative identities express necessary propositions follows from Kripke’s now widely accepted thesis that proper 




posteriori, I shall argue that they are in fact a priori, strictly speaking.    
Kripke’s formal argument for the claim that they are a posteriori, which appears briefly on 
page 104 of Naming and Necessity, is flawed.  The argument relies on the viability of the strong 
disquotation principle, which is now widely seen as false (as opposed to the weak disquotation 
principle, which is widely regarded as true).48  I will not examine Kripke’s formal argument here. See 
Soames’ 2003, pp. 379-89 for a detailed critique of Kripke’s formal argument for the a posteriori 
status of informative identities and Kripke’s problematic reliance on the strong disquotation principle. 
See also this footnote.49 To my knowledge, no philosopher other than Kripke has advanced any 
formal argument for the existence of necessary a posteriori identities.50 Hence, apart from untutored, 
                                                 
48 The weak disquotation principle says: if a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker s who understands a 
sentence S is disposed to accept S, and believes S to be true, then s believes the proposition semantically expressed by S. 
The strong disquotation principle says:  If a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker s believes a proposition P, 
then s will be disposed to accept any sentence S that s understands that expresses P.   
 
49
 Kripke formal argument that informative identity propositions are knowable only a posteriori is found on page 104 of 
Naming and Necessity: 
“... we do not know a priori that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and are in no position to find out the answer except 
empirically… this is so because we could have evidence qualitatively indistinguishable from the evidence we have and 
determine the reference of the two names by the positions of the two planets in the sky, without the planets being the 
same.” (104) 
Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks, and others have roundly criticized this argument.  According to Jeff Speaks 
(www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/415/kripke-identity-sentences.html):  
 
“Kripke’s point seems to be that we could be in a qualitatively identical situation with respect to the contexts of 
introduction and use of these names, and yet, in that possible situation w, the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
could be false. [But] this argument seems puzzling: the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ expresses a different 
proposition as used in w than it does as used in the actual world. So why does the fact that the proposition 
expressed by this sentence in w is false show anything about the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by 
this sentence in the actual world? A way to fill the gap in the argument is via principles connecting acceptance of 
sentences with belief in the propositions expressed by those sentences. Consider, e.g., the following such principle: 
If an agent understands some sentence S which expresses the proposition p, then: (the agent is justified 
in accepting S iff the agent is justified in believing p) 
We can then read Kripke as arguing that agents cannot know a priori that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, and 
using the above principle to reach the conclusion that they cannot know a priori that Hesperus is Phosphorus.” 
 
The problem with Kripke’s argument is that it goes through only if we accept the principle Speaks refers to, which is in fact 
the Strong Disquotation Principle. However, the Strong Disquotation Principle is highly dubious. See Scott Soames’ 2005, 
pages 379-89 for a critique of Kripke’s argument and a critique of the strong disquotation principle.  Kripke himself most 
likely does not endorse the strong disquotation principle, as his Paderewski Puzzle (1979) can be seen as a reductio of it.     
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 I shall have nothing to say here about Kripke’s argument that identity sentences expressing natural kinds, such as ‘Water 




raw intuitions about the matter, there are scant grounds for maintaining that these sorts of propositions 
are a posteriori.   
Before I argue that these identity propositions are a priori, it is necessary first to clarify what it 
means for a proposition to be a priori and what means for a proposition to be a posteriori.  Following 
Fitch (1975, 243) I shall say that a proposition is a priori iff it is knowable a priori (even if the 
proposition is also knowable a posteriori), and a proposition is a posteriori iff it is knowable only a 
posteriori.  Hence, mathematical propositions, (at least some of) which are knowable both on a priori 
and a posteriori grounds, are to be classified as a priori propositions.51  Propositions such as the 
proposition that Barack Obama was the president of the US in 2014, which are knowable only on a 
posteriori grounds, are to be classified as a posteriori propositions.  Accordingly, I shall construe 
Kripke’s claim that true identity sentences express necessary a posteriori propositions as the claim that 
these propositions are knowable only a posteriori.  I shall argue that the propositions expressed by true 
informative identity sentences involving proper names are a priori because they are knowable both on 
a posteriori and a priori grounds.  The a posteriori way of knowing them is much more important and 
powerful because it enables the knower to draw many further inferences, whereas the a priori way of 
knowing them does not.   It is for this reason that we have the powerful but erroneous intuition that 
they are a posteriori.  
The A POSTERIORI way of knowing PROP-2 (the informative identity proposition expressed 
by ‘Clark Kent is Superman’)  
 
Suppose Lois learns that her ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier token (which we may call ‘dCK’), 
which is about Kent-Super and contains a Clark Kent-y conception, has the same subject as her 
‘Superman’-labeled dossier token (which we may call ‘dSM’), which is about Kent-Super and contains 
                                                                                                                                                                       
more closely tied to his essentialism. There are distinct arguments behind the claims about the epistemological status of 
these sorts of propositions on the one hand and identity propositions involving proper names on the other.       
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 For example, the a priori proposition expressed by ‘1+1 = 2’ can be justifiably believed on the basis of empirical 
evidence. I can have empirical evidence for it if I, e.g., place one apple into a basket, another apple, and then count them to 




a Superman-y conception.  It follows as a matter of pure logic that she believes that the dossier types 
instantiated by dCK and dSM, DCK and DSM respectively, are individuated by the same subject.  That 
dossier types DCK and DSM are individuated by the same subject is precisely the proposition that, 
according to the TIUT, is expressed by (2)—PROP-2.  (See sects. 2.4, 2.5).  By learning a “local” fact 
about her own mental architecture, i.e., that her dossier tokens dCK and dSM have the same subject— 
Lois thereby comes to believe the general proposition that dossier types DCK and DSM are individuated 
by the same subject.  
Here, Lois learns PROP-2 via a posteriori means.  No one can tell that Lois’ dossier tokens dCK 
and dSM have the same subject by armchair reflection.  To find out whether Lois’ dossier tokens have 
the same subject we would have to examine the dossier tokens in Lois’ mental architecture—the ‘Clark 
Kent’-labeled and the ‘Superman’-labeled dossier tokens—to determine whether they have the same 
subject.  This would involve an inquiry into causal-historical facts; we would need to learn about the 
events that led to the creation of these dossier tokens in Lois’ mind.  This would be a purely 
empirical/a posteriori inquiry.  As Hume taught us, we cannot know anything about what-causes-what 
by pure reason.  Lois needs empirical evidence to learn that her two dossiers have the same subject.  
She would need to see Kent-Super dressed as Clark Kent bending a bar of steel, or catch Clark Kent 
changing into his Superman outfit, or notice that Clark Kent and Superman look suspiciously similar, 
to realize that that her dossiers have the same subject.  These sorts of empirical evidence will make it 
manifest to her that her dossier tokens are about the same man. Hence, the discovering of an 
informative identity, such as that Clark Kent is Superman, is here an empirical process involving 
empirical evidence.  The agent empirically finds out that his distinct dossier tokens have the same 
subject, thereby coming belief that, in general, the dossiers types instantiated by tokens of those types 
are individuated by the same subject.    
The A PRIORI way of knowing PROP-2 (the informative identity proposition expressed by 





In addition to being known in an a posteriori way as described above, the proposition expressed 
by (2), PROP-2, can also be known in an a priori way. Therefore, it is an a priori proposition (since a 
proposition being knowable a priori is sufficient for it being classified as an a priori proposition).  
According to the TIUT’s account of the content of proper names when used in a Conception-
indicating way, as set out in section 2.4 supra, the proposition expressed by (2), PROP-2, could also be 
expressed by (2)††. 
 
(2)††  The subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject  
and a Clark Kent-y conception is the subject individuating the dossier type 
individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception.  
 
Note that (2)†† is a logically true and therefore, one may know a priori that it expresses a true 
proposition.52 53  Therefore, any rational agent who read (2)†† and noticed that it was logically true 
should assent to it and be willing to assert it.  As discussed in section 2.8, supra, The TIUT posits that 
the agent would count as understanding sentence (2)†† even if s/he knows next to nothing about the 
properties of the bearer of ‘Kent-Super’ and even if she fails to realize that ‘Kent-Super’ refers to the 
same person as ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman.’  Grasping the character of the names is sufficient for 
understanding them. Via the weak disquotation principle,54 we may infer that any such agent who 
understand (2)†† and assents to utterances of the sentence believes the proposition semantically 
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 Technically, (2)†† is not expressive of an a priori proposition because it is not a priori knowable whether Kent-Super 
exists. A sentence that would in fact express an a priori proposition would be: ‘If Clark Kent exists, then Clark Kent is 
Superman’, for on the TIUT this would mean the same as the logically true sentence: ‘If the subject individuating the 
dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception exists, the subject individuating the 
dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception is the subject individuating the dossier 
type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception.’ This sentence is logically true. For the sake of 
exegetical simplicity, I leave out the “if...exists” clause and treat (2)†† as if it genuinely expressed an a priori proposition.    
 
53 In order for (2)†† to be logically true, it would have to be uttered in a language in which it is stipulated by convention that 
syntactically identical strings are synonymous, so that there can be no doubt that the first and second occurrences of ‘Kent-
Super’ in (2)†† refer to the same individual.  Note that what I call the Meaning Consistency Principle already creates this 
presumption that syntactically identical expressions have the same meaning/semantic value. 
 
54 According to the weak disquotation principle, if a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker s who understands 




expressed by (2)††, PROP-2.  Since the agent’s reason for believing PROP-2 is the mere fact that he 
recognizes that a sentence that he understands is logically true, rather than empirical evidence, his or 
her grounds for believing PROP-2 are a priori.  Hence, PROP-2 is a priori because it’s being knowable 
a priori is sufficient for classifying it as an a priori proposition, even if it is also knowable empirically 
(via learning that one’s dossier tokens, dCK and dSM, have the same subject). 
Why learning PROP-2 a posteriori is more important than learning it a priori 
When Lois comes to believe the proposition expressed by (2) via believing the a posteriori 
proposition that her dossier tokens dCK and dSM have the same subject, she is able to draw a host of 
important and interesting inferences. Upon learning this, she realizes that all of the information in her 
two dossiers, her ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’-labeled dossiers, relate to the same individual.  She 
may infer that they guy she works with is the Superhero she loves, that if her colleague named ‘Clark 
Kent’ ate eggs for breakfast then a flying super hero did, that if her mild-mannered colleague is 6’ 9”, 
so is her super hero love interest; that the guy she calls ‘Clark Kent’ is amazingly strong, and so forth.  
By contrast, when she believes the same proposition merely by accepting (2)†† and seeing that it is 
logically true, she is able to infer no further facts whatsoever from her belief.  She cannot even infer 
from her acceptance of (2)†† that sentence (2) expresses a true proposition, since she does not 
recognize that sentence (2) and (2)†† express the same proposition.  Lois might assent to (2)†† and 
assert that it expresses a true proposition, but nevertheless insist that the person referred to as ‘Kent-
Super’ in sentence (2)††, whoever he may be (and if he in fact exists), is not the individual she knows 
as ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman.’ As I claimed in section 2.8, Lois may rationally fail to realize that the 
names ‘Clark Kent,’ ‘Superman’ (used in (2)), and ‘Kent-Super’ (used in (2)††) all co-refer.  She grasps 
the character of the names without realizing that they have the same content.  Hence, Lois suffers here 
from a phenomenon akin to what Nathan Salmon (1986) has called “propositional recognition failure” 




matter how much she reflects upon the matter) that they express the same proposition.  
We might say that Lois realizing that PROP-2 is true via learning that (2)†† expresses a true 
proposition results in an “inferentially impoverished” belief that PROP-2.  When she learns PROP-2 
via learning that her dossier tokens dCK and dSM have the same subject, she ends up with an 
“inferentially rich” belief that PROP-2.  This explains why we erroneously intuit that PROP-2 must be 
a posteriori: anyone who learns it merely via a priori means ends up with “inferentially impoverished” 
belief—unable infer anything useful or interesting about the world. By contrast, anyone who learns it 
via empirical means, by believing that their dossier tokens have the same subject, ends up with an 
“inferentially rich” belief. Since we are interested in what agents believe in inferentially rich ways, and 
tend to ignore situations in which agents believe propositions in inferentially impoverished ways, we 
focus only on the case where Lois learns PROP-2 in an a posteriori way.  Nevertheless, PROP-2 is to 
be counted as a priori because it can be learned by a priori means, even if learning the proposition this 
way results in an inferentially impoverished belief.   
We are interested in an agent’s beliefs to be able to make sense of and predict his or her 
behavior, both linguistic and otherwise.  However, an agent’s inferentially impoverished beliefs tell us 
little or nothing about what the agent will do or say.  We care only about inferentially rich beliefs.  
Hence, we would not ascribe to Lois Lane the belief that Clark Kent is Superman merely because she 
reads sentence (2)†† and recognizes it as logically true and therefore expressive of a true proposition.  
Rather, we would only ascribe to her the belief that PROP-2 if she came to believe it via believing the 
a posteriori proposition that dCK and dSM have the same subject, for this would result in her having an 
inferentially rich belief.  The expression “belief” (as well as other expressions used to ascribe 
propositional attitudes) is used in propositional attitude ascriptions to ascribe only inferentially rich 
beliefs (or other attitudes) to the ascribee, and filter out inferentially impoverished beliefs.  Hence, I 





(6) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman 
 
would express a literally false proposition even if Lois believed the proposition referred to by the 
‘that’-clause in an inferentially impoverished way. Sentence (6) would express a true proposition only 
if Lois believed the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause in an inferentially rich way.       
We can recognize and understand propositions in different ways; different ways of knowing 
propositions involve different inferential strengths 
 
As Nathan Salmon has stressed (1986), propositions can be grasped in different ways. One may 
believe a proposition when it is presented one way but fail to believe it when presented another way (in 
which case one suffers from “propositional recognition failure” because one fails to recognize the 
proposition as the same when it is presented in different ways).  Lois may come to believe PROP-2 by 
believing that (2)†† expresses a true proposition and at the same time believe that (2) expresses a false 
proposition: she fails to realize that the same proposition is presented by the two sentences.  The 
TIUT’s account of proper names as indexicals explains propositional recognition failure: agents may 
understand two sentences by grasping the character of the indexicals it contains without realizing that 
these indexicals have the same content.  Lois Lane may understand both sentence (2)†† and sentence 
(2) and see that (2)†† must express a true proposition (because she realizes it is logically true) but 
nevertheless she fails to realize that the proposition it expresses is the same one that (2) expresses. She 
does not realize that the name ‘Kent-Super’ in sentence (2)†† has the same referent as either of the 
names ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman’ in sentence (2).  
A ‘Looser sense’ in which these propositions are a posteriori 
 I stated at the beginning of this section that I would argue that identity propositions such as 
PROP-2 are a priori strictly speaking.  I also stated that there was a looser sense in which we can say 
that propositions such as PROP-2 are a posteriori.   I shall now discuss this looser sense on which such 




contingent rather than necessary. Hence, it will turn out that we can classify these propositions as 
either necessary a priori or as contingent a posteriori, but not as necessary a posteriori.    
The weak disquotation principle states that if an agent accepts sentence s, a sentence the agent 
understands, and s expresses proposition p, then s believes p.  In accord with this principle, I claimed 
that Lois Lane believes PROP-2 because of her acceptance of sentence (2)††, a sentence that Lois 
understands and that expresses PROP-2.  I suggested that strictly speaking Lois does understand the 
sentence because understanding a proper name requires only grasping its character and does not 
require having descriptive knowledge about the referent (or content) of the name.  On this view, it 
takes very little to understand a proper name.  It takes little more than understanding that a syntactic 
string was meant by the speaker as a name and perhaps knowing whether the speaker intended the 
name to have a Millian or Conception-indicating reading.  For Lois to count as understanding (2)††, she 
does not need to know anything substantive about the name’s referent, nor realize that ‘Kent-Super’ 
refers to the same individual as the names ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman.’  But the open question is 
whether there is another sense of understand, a non-strict or looser sense on which we can say that 
Lois does not understand sentence (2)††.  I believe there is.   Speaking non-strictly, there is an 
important sense in which she does not understand the name ‘Kent-Super’ as used in sentence (2)††: in 
the sense of knowing who.  She does not know anything about ‘Kent-Super’—she does not know who 
he is in that she cannot say anything substantive about him. She cannot describe him at all. She 
associates with the name no identifying descriptive knowledge whatsoever.  So even if I want to say 
she grasps the name ‘Kent-Super’ strictly speaking because realizes the string is being used as a name 
and she grasps the character of the name, she does not understand who Kent-Super is in a different, 
more robust sense of knowing anything about him that could be used to pick him out of a crowd. She 
lacks descriptive identifying information about him.55   
                                                 
55 The contrast between robust and non-robust understanding can be illustrated by an example from physics.  Suppose that a 




Now let us consider whether there are any such things as posteriori necessary identities if we 
consider PROP-2 to be a posteriori on the non-strict sense.  I want to answer this question in the 
negative.  Here is why.  When we start requiring agents to have knowledge who information before 
they count ask understanding proper names and proper name-containing sentences, we are therefore 
requiring them to have all sorts of contingent knowledge about the referents of the proper names in the 
sentences, since knowledge who information is (obviously) contingent.  There may very well be a non-
strict sense in which an informative identity sentence such as ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ expresses an a 
posteriori proposition. But on this non-strict sense, an agent must have the ability to draw inferences 
about contingent facts upon realizing the identity is true (e.g., that a reporter is also a superhero) to 
count as realizing the identity, and this involves having contingent information about the referents of 
these names.      
Concluding Remarks on Necessary a posteriori Propositions  
Propositions are a posteriori iff they are only knowable a priori.  Propositions knowable both a 
posteriori and a priori are a priori propositions.  According to the TIUT, informative identity 
propositions are knowable both a priori and a posteriori.  But it is only when the proposition is known 
a posteriori, via learning that her dossier tokens dCK and dSM have the same subject, that the agent can 
infer anything interesting.  As ascribers, we are only interested in agents’ beliefs that will allow us to 
predict their behavior, both verbal and otherwise, and to predict the further inferences they will draw 
                                                                                                                                                                       
charmed baryons have masses ranging between 2300 and 2700 MeV/c2.  Apart from understanding that charmed baryons 
are some sort of particle, this science novice does not understand the function of a particle in the atom and does not grasp 
the meaning of “MeV/c2” except insofar as s/he realizes that is refers to a measurement of the mass of a particle. He does 
not understand what mass is as it pertains to a particle, only possessing the layman’s non-scientific understanding of “mass” 
as it applies to macroscopic objects.  Are we prepared to say that this science novice understands the proposition that 
charmed baryons have masses ranging between 2300 and 2700 MeV/c2 well enough to say that s/he really believes it?  
There is a non-robust sense of understanding according to which we can say that s/he does understand (and believe) this 
proposition, given that he is disposed to assent to utterances of the sentence ‘Charmed baryons have masses ranging 
between 2300 and 2700 MeV/c2.’ However, there is also a robust sense of understanding on which we would say that this 
science novice does not understand the proposition well enough to count as believing it. His belief is highly inferentially 
impoverished. He cannot infer any further facts about particle physics from his belief, nor can he say why this fact is 
important or how it fits in with quantum theory.  I do not think there is any non-arbitrary answer to the question whether the 
science novice really understands or believes the proposition. All we can do is recognize that there are different answers we 
can give to this question depending on our standards for what should count as sufficient understanding when we attribute 




on the basis of what they already believe.  Hence, we are disposed to discount the a priori way of 
knowing an informative identity proposition, and therefore, we have the erroneous intuition that 
informative identity propositions are knowable only a posteriori.   
The TIUT explains why we have the strong (but ultimately erroneous) intuition, emphasized by 
Kripke (1979, 1980), that the learning of the necessary propositions such as those expressed by 
informative identity sentences involves an empirical discovery.  The TIUT offers us a picture of 
necessary identity propositions (necessary, because of the rigidity of the names in the identity 
sentences expressing them) that are discovered to be true empirically because the discovery process 
involves the agent learning that her dossier tokens dCK and dSM have the same subject, i.e., learning 
empirical facts about his own mental architecture.  The agent empirically finds out that his distinct 
dossier tokens have the same subject, thereby coming belief that, in general, the dossiers types 
instantiated by tokens of those types are individuated by the same subject.  The TIUT agrees with 
Kripke to the extent that it posits that the necessary propositions expressed by ‘Clark Kent is 
Superman’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ are usually learned empirically, and we are mostly interested 
in the cases in which agents learn those propositions empirically. However, the TIUT takes issue with 
Kripke’s claim that these propositions are therefore a posteriori.  There are ways of learning them that 
are strictly speaking a priori and this is sufficient to classify them as a priori propositions. If we speak 
non-strictly, there is a sense on which these propositions can be considered a posteriori, but they are 
contingent in this non-strict sense because contingent knowledge who information about the bearers of 












2.11 Ascribing Belief to Non-Verbal Agents 
 
 Suppose that Lois Lane were a non-verbal but intelligent deaf-mute or an intelligent non-
human animal incapable of speech.  She does not use or recognize proper names because she incapable 
of using language.  Nevertheless, she might very well believe that Clark Kent and Superman are two 
distinct individuals and that Superman flies and Clark Kent does not, despite her inability to express 
these beliefs using language.  Despite the fact that Lois neither uses nor recognizes the names ‘Clark 
Kent’ or ‘Superman,’ we may report her beliefs using sentences (5n) and (6).  
 
(5n)  Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent flies 
(6)  Lois Lane believes that Superman flies 
 
On the TIUT, the truth of (5n) and (6) does not entail that Lois is disposed to utter either ‘Clark Kent 
flies’ or ‘Superman flies,’ or that she would assent to either of these sentence.  Furthermore, the truth 
of (5n) and (6) do not entail that Lois has dossiers that she labels with the names ‘Clark Kent’ or 
‘Superman.’  The semantics of these sentences (when those names are used in a Conception-indicating 
way) reveal why: 
 
5n-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois’ dossier token d1 instantiating the same dossier 
type, DCK, as instantiated by the ascriber’s ‘Clark Kent’-labeled dossier token d2 from whose 
label the ascriber draws the name ‘Clark Kent,’ and NOT Believes (Lois, <the subject of d1, 
flies>) 
 
6-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois’ dossier token d3 instantiating the same dossier 
type, DSM, as instantiated by the ascriber’s ‘Superman’-labeled dossier token d4 from whose 
label the ascriber draws the name ‘Superman,’ and Believes (Lois, <the subject of d3, flies>) 
 
As shown above, the Conception-indicating character does not require that the ascribee label his or her 
dossiers in any particular way.  Rather, it requires only that the ascriber labels his or her dossier in 
accordance with the name uttered (and that s/he draws the name from the label).  The Conception-




whose label the ascriber draws the name, but importantly the ascribee may have a dossier token of this 
type even if he or she labels differently his/her dossiers or if his/her dossiers lack labels altogether.56 
So when uttering (5n) and (6), an ascriber may use the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ to express 
contrasting conceptions of Kent-Super (which aim to be similar to the non-verbal Lois’ contrasting 
conceptions) even if Lois does not associate those conceptions with those names (or for that matter, 
with any names whatsoever).  Lois has two distinct dossiers for Kent-Super, one containing a Clark 
Kent-y conception and the other a Superman-y conception, even though her dossiers are not labeled 
with proper names because she is non-verbal.  This is a powerful feature of the TIUT—it explains how 
we can use proper names to ascribe belief to non-verbal agents.   
Furthermore, the TIUT explains how one can ascribe belief in cases in which the ascribee is 
verbal but where the ascriber does not know which contrasting proper names the ascribee would use.  
Consider the Hesperus/Phosphorus case: for many centuries, the ancient Greeks believed that 
Hesperus, a celestial body seen at a certain location in the morning sky at certain times of the year, was 
a distinct object from Phosphorus, a celestial body appearing in the evening at a different time of the 
year at a different location in the sky.  However, ancient Babylonian astronomers had previously 
discovered that Hesperus and Phosphorus were the same celestial body, which we today refer to as the 
planet ‘Venus.’  Eventually the Greeks came to accept the Babylonian view and came to believe that 
Hesperus was Phosphorus.  ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ were Greek names for this object as seen in 
the evening and as seen in the morning, respectively. We do not in fact know what names the 
Babylonians used prior to the discovery of the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus.  We also know 
that the ancient Maya independently discovered the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus, but we do 
not know what names they used either. Nevertheless, we can accurately say (using the Greek names) 
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 The fact that the ascribee’s dossier tokens lack the representation bears the name ‘NN’, where ‘NN’ is the name uttered 
inside the ‘that’-clause, means that the ascriber’s ‘NN’-labeled dossier token cannot match the ascribee’s corresponding 





that the Maya and the Babylonians discovered that Hesperus was Phosphorus.  The TIUT explain why 
we may use the Greek names to say this even though the Maya and the Babylonians did not use them. 
A speaker can utter the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ to pick out the dossier types instantiated 
by his or her ‘Hesperus’-labeled and ‘Phosphorus’-labeled dossier tokens, and say that the Babylonians 
and the Maya had dossier tokens of these types such that they did not initially realize that dossier token 
instantiating these types had the same subject, and then came to later to believe that they did.  There is 
nothing in the semantics implicating that the Maya or Babylonians ever labeled their dossiers using 
these names.   
 This feature gives the TIUT an advantage over the theory or Graeme Forbes (1990), which like 
the TIUT invokes of the notion of mental dossiers.  Problematically, on Forbes’ theory, the sentence 
‘The Maya believed that Hesperus was Phosphorus’ would be glossed as:  
 
Hesperus is such that, for the Maya’s so-labeled way of thinking of it, α, and Phosphorus is 
such that, for the Maya’s so-labeled way of thinking of it, β: Believed (The Maya, < α = β >)   
 
 
The problem is the “so-labeled” language: According to Forbes’ theory, the names used in the ‘that’-
clause of every propositional attitude ascription are the labels of the ascribee’s dossiers.  Thus, 
according to Forbes, when I utter ‘The Maya believed that Hesperus was Phosphorus’ I am saying that 
the Maya had dossiers that they labeled ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ these dossiers were both about 
the same object but represented that object in different ways, α and β, and the Maya believed that these 
dossiers were about the same object.  The problem is that the Maya did not label their dossiers with 
these names.  On Forbes’ theory, it is not possible to ascribe belief where one does not know what 
names the ascribee used or uses to label his or her dossiers.  This is a serious problem with the theory. 
Plainly, we can ascribe belief to agents when we do not know how they label their dossiers, as in the 
case of the Maya/Babylonians and Hesperus/Phosphorus.  We can moreover ascribe belief even when 




in the non-verbal Lois Lane example above.57   
 
 
2.12 Solution to Kripke’s Puzzle 
One of Kripke’s principal aims in his famous paper “A Puzzle about Belief” (1979), in which 
he first discussed the Puzzle that has come to be called “Kripke’s Puzzle,” was to defend Millianism 
from a certain reductio argument often used against it by neo-Fregeans.  Let is call this neo-Fregean 
argument against Millianism “The argument from substitution failure.”   
The Argument from Substitution Failure 
(i) Millianism entails that the following principle, SUBSTITUTIVITY, is viable:  
SUBSTITUTIVITY: because co-referential names do not differ in any semantic property, 
they are freely substitutable into propositional attitude and modal contexts without 
changing the proposition expressed or its truth-value. 
 
(ii) However, SUBSTITUTIVITY entails that agents sometimes believe inconsistent 
propositions.  For example, Lois Lane would believe both that Kent-Super flies (when she 
conceives him in a Superman-y way) and that he does not fly (when she conceives him in a 
Superman-y way).  
 
(iii) A rational agent would not, upon reflection, believe inconsistent proposition. 
 
(iv) Lois Lane is a rational and reflective agent, yet she believes inconsistent propositions even 
after rational reflection upon her beliefs.  
 
(v) Therefore, SUBSTITUTIVITY (and Millianism itself) must be false. Co-designative names 
are not substitutable in propositional attitude contexts.58  
 
Kripke aims to show that the argument from substitution failure, sketched above, does not in 
fact impugn Millianism because the same sort of conclusion (where a rational and reflective agent ends 
up looking like they believe a contradiction) follows from a valid argument that makes no presumption 
                                                 
57 Metalinguistic theories of proper names run into similar problems.  Metalinguistic theories of proper names, although 
they differ from one another in the details, maintain, in rough sketch, that the meaning of a proper name ‘NN’ is the bearer 
of ‘NN’ or the individual called ‘NN.’  On such a theory, the ascription ‘The Maya believes that Hesperus was Phosphorus’ 
would mean the same as ‘The Maya believes that the bearer of ‘Hesperus’ was the bearer of ‘Phosphorus.’  The problem is 
that the Maya were not familiar with either of these names, so they did not entertain any beliefs about them.  
 




either that SUBSTITUTIVITY or Millianism is true.  Therefore, Millianism is not the culprit.  The 
argument from substitution failure fails to refute Millianism, according to Kripke, because the very 
same puzzle about belief ascription arises without presupposing Millianism. All we need to do to 
generate the puzzle is to assume the innocuous weak disquotation principle.   
There are two versions of Kripke’s puzzle, but here I discuss only the Paderewski version of 
the puzzle, which is in fact the more challenging version of the puzzle.  Kripke asks us to consider the 
case of Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860 – 1941), a noted Polish pianist who also a politician—the prime 
minister of Poland for most of 1919. Suppose that a man named Peter is familiar with Paderewski the 
pianist and with Paderewski the politician, but Peter fails to realize that these are the same person.  
Peter thinks the pianist and the politician are two separate people.  He assents to the sentence 
‘Paderewski had musical talent’ when he takes the speaker to be referring to the pianist, and assents to 
the sentence ‘Paderewski did not have musical talent’ when he takes the speaker to be referring to the 
politician (believing that politicians rarely have musical talent).  Now consider the Weak Disquotation 
principle.  
 
WEAK DISQUOTATION  
If a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker s who understands a sentence S is 
disposed to accept S, and believes S to be true, then s believes the proposition semantically 
expressed by S. 
 
Based on Peter’s assent to ‘Paderewski had musical talent,’ a sentence Peter understands, we may infer 
that he believes that Paderewski had musical talent.  Based on his assent to ‘Paderewski did not have 
musical talent,’ a sentence Peter understands, we may infer that he believes that Paderewski did not 
have musical talent.  Hence, we may infer that Peter believes both that Paderewski had musical talent 
and that he did not have musical talent.  So Peter it looks like Peter believes inconsistent propositions.  




whether SUBSTITUTIVITY is viable.  He has merely assumed the unobjectionable weak disquotation 
principle.  So there is a puzzle about belief ascription that arises whether or not we presuppose 
Millianism is true. The puzzle arises merely if we presuppose an unobjectionable principle such as 
Weak Disquotation, which Nathan Salmon once described as so undeniably true as to be practically 
analytic.59   
Kripke concludes that Peter’s case “lies in an area where our normal apparatus for the 
ascription of belief is placed under the greatest strain and may even break down.” (Kripke, 1979, 452).  
According to Kripke, the problem is that we have no plausible answer to the question: does Peter 
believe or does Peter disbelieve that Paderewski had musical talent?  We have four possible answers to 
this question, none of which Kripke thinks are acceptable:   
 
(a)  Peter believes neither that Paderewski had musical talent, nor that he lacked it.  
(b)  Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.  
(c)  Peter believes that Paderewski did not have musical talent. 
(d)  Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent and that he did not have musical 
talent.      
 
 
But what exactly is wrong with option (d)? Why should we not say that Peter both believes and 
disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent?  Why not accept that rational agents can believe 
inconsistent propositions?  Kripke thinks that a reflective and rational agent should be able to examine 
the content of belief and, given enough time to reflect, see that there is an inconsistency and correct 
him- or herself.  Kripke writes: “…surely anyone … is in principle in a position to notice and correct 
contradictory beliefs if he has them.”  But I think this notion that a rational agent should be able to 
examine the contents of his beliefs, as if they were perfectly transparent to him/her, is implausible.  In 
section 2.8 above where I discussed the problem of inconsistent rationality, I argued (more or less in 
                                                 




agreement with many Millians such as Nathan Salmon and other Millians who speak or ways of taking 
propositions or propositional guises) that agents may not always be able to see the contents the 
propositions they believe. Their contents are partially masked.  The TIUT takes the fundamentals of 
this Millian approach—“guise Millianism”—to be essentially correct, except that the TIUT explains 
the inability of the agent to see the propositions he believes transparently in terms of indexicality of 
proper names. Proper names are indexicals, whose characters but not contents are transparent to the 
agent.  Peter both believes and disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent but he is not irrational 
for doing so because he does not realize that his beliefs are inconsistent and cannot realize this no 
matter how long he reflects on the matter.60  The information that the propositions are inconsistent is 
not inside the Peter’s head, nor is it inferable from information inside his head.  
  Some philosophers have noted that Kripke’s puzzle presents a puzzle not so much about the 
nature of the propositions that Peter believes, but is fundamentally a puzzle about belief attribution.  
What is puzzling is how we should express what Peter believes “in the idiom for belief ascription 
provided by English, if we limit ourselves to identifying the object of his beliefs [with the name 
                                                 
60 There is a distinction to be drawn between the following ascription sentence forms: 
 
Peter believes P and disbelieves P (= Peter believes P and believes NOT P) 
 
Peter believes P and does not believe P (= Peter believes P and it is not the case that        
Peter believes P)  
 
I think that the former ascription could be true, since the TIUT posits (as do the Millians) that agents may rationally believe 
singular propositions and their negations, i.e., rationally believe and disbelieve singular propositions. (See the discussion on 
the Problem of Rational inconsistent belief, supra at section 2.7).  However, the second ascription is necessarily false; this 
follows from the law of non-contradiction. If Peter believes P, it is false that he fails to believe P.  If it is the case that Peter 
believes P, then it is not the case that he does not believe P. There is a difference in meaning between ‘X disbelieves P’ 
(which is the same as ‘X believes NOT P’) and ‘X does not believe P’ (which is the same as ‘It is false that X believes P’).   
Ascribers would be guilty of contradicting themselves if they uttered: ‘Peter believes that Paderewski was musically gifted 
and does not believe that Paderewski was musically gifted,’60 but I show that ascribers would not contradict themselves if 





‘Paderewski’].” 61 Admittedly, it sounds somewhat awkward or unidiomatic to utter (10) and leave it at 
that: 
 
(10) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent and disbelieves that he has musical 
talent.  
 
I believe (10) expresses a true proposition. Nevertheless, there is something unidiomatic or awkward 
about it. Speakers would probably use a different, more idiomatic sentence to communicate 
information about Peter’s confused and inconsistent belief with respect to Paderewski.  Why is 
sentence (10) unidiomatic and awkward sounding? Why would it not be uttered by most speakers?  
What other, more idiomatic or informative ways would ordinary speakers find to ascribe belief to 
Peter? This is the issue to which I shall now turn.  
First, I shall briefly revisit the issue of substitution in Hesperus/Phosphorus and Kent/Superman 
sorts of cases where two names used in the propositional attitude ascription pairs. Then I will come 
back to the Paderewski case, which involves just one name.   
As discussed in section 2.7, according to the TIUT, in the Hesperus/Phosphorus and 
Kent/Superman cases speakers can utter Millian (coarse-grained) or Conception-indicating (finer-
grained) ascriptions, depending on their expressive purposes. Sentence (11) bellow would be a Millian 
ascription in the Hesperus/Phosphorus case relating to an ancient Greek astronomer living in an era 
before it had become known in Greece that Hesperus was identical to Phosphorus: 
 
(11) The ancient Greek astronomer believed that Venus was visible in the morning but also 
disbelieved that Venus was visible in the morning.62    
                                                 
61 Richard, Mark. “Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief,” page 18. 
https://markrichardphilosophy.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/kripkes-puzzle-about-belief.pdf [accessed on May 31, 2015]. 
 
62
 ‘Hesperus’ was the ancient Greek name for the planet Venus when observed in the evening (at a certain location in the 
evening sky during at certain portions of the year), and ‘Phosphorus’ the ancient Greek name for the planet Venus when 
observed in the morning (at a different location in the morning sky during certain portions of the year). The Greeks long 






(11) has the same logical form as (10).  The ascription attributes inconsistent beliefs to the ancient 
Greek astronomer using one single name, ‘Venus,’ just as (10) attributes inconsistent beliefs to Peter 
using one single name, ‘Paderewski.’   The ancient Greek Astronomer believes inconsistent singular 
propositions of which Venus is a constituent.  The fact that the same name, ‘Venus,’ appears twice 
over suggests that we are attributing inconsistent beliefs to the ancient Greek astronomer (pursuant to 
the Meaning Consistency Principle).  Though expressing a true proposition, (11) is nevertheless 
unidiomatic and awkward.  I think the syntactically de re attitude ascription (12), below, would be a 
more usual and idiomatic way to express the same proposition.  
 
 
(12) The ancient Greek astronomer believed of Venus both that it was visible in the 
morning and that it was not visible in the morning.   
 
Consider now the Conception-indicating ascription (13): 
 
(13)      The ancient Greek astronomer believed that Phosphorus was visible in the morning but 
disbelieved that Hesperus was visible in the morning.  
 
 
In (13), the use of two different co-designative proper names (‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’) alerts the 
audience, pursuant to the Meaning Consistency Principle (see sections 2.7.2, 2.9, supra), that the 
speaker is drawing a distinction between different conceptions.  
 
Meaning Consistency: Multiple occurrences of the same syntactic string in a sentence 
generally entail that the speaker meant the same thing by each occurrence.63 Occurrences of 
different syntactic strings entail a difference in meaning. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Babylonians that Hesperus and Phosphorus were the same body.  
63
 By generally, I mean that there are exceptions when the conversational context makes it clear that the speaker means 
different things by the same expression (see Bill/Liz example, section 2.8 supra), or where the grammar of the sentence 
entails a difference in meaning (e.g., in the sentence “Rose rose in popularity beginning in high school” we infer from the 




The Meaning Consistency principle explains for the differences between (11) and (13).  It 
explains why we would not utter (11) as a Conception-indicating ascription and would not utter (13) as 
a Millian ascription.  In (11), the use of the same name twice over, ‘Venus,’ indicates to the audience 
that the speaker means the same thing on each of its occurrences, so the audience will tend to suppose 
that the speaker is attributing inconsistent beliefs to the ascribee.  In (13), the use of different names 
usually entails that the speaker means something different by the different names.    
There is a pragmatic principle of conversation that I think explains why (12) is a more 
idiomatic than (11), the “Attribution of Consistency” principle64: 
 
Attribution of Consistency: We tend to attribute beliefs to ascribees in a way that avoids 
making them sound irrational. 
 
Sentence (11) is somewhat ambiguous because a sentence of this form could be used to state that a 
person is irrational and believes a proposition and its negation knowing full well that they are 
inconsistent.  It probably would not be understood that way, since, on the principle of charity, we tend 
to presume that people are not irrational in this sort of way. (12), by contrast with (11), is not similarly 
ambiguous—syntactically de re attitude ascriptions with the “of”-locution are specially tailored so that 
speakers avoid the seeming attribution of irrationality to the ascribee.    
There is a further pragmatic principle of conversation that I think explains why (11) would be 
an unusual, unidiomatic sentence: 
 
Preference for Fine-grained Ascriptions:  When ascribing belief, one should give as much 
information about conceptions as is possible when two conceptions of the same object are 
being contrasted, if one can easily do so and if one is aware of the relevant conceptions in the 
conversational context. (This would be a corollary of Grice’s maxim of quantity.) 
 
Sentence (13) is a more natural and idiomatic attitude ascription than (11) because (13) gives much 
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more information to the audience than (11) would, consistent with Grice’s maxim of quantity.  It tells 
the audience about the different ways that the ancient astronomer conceived Venus.   It imparts this 
additional information in an efficient way, without the use of any additional words (assuming that the 
audience knows that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are different names for Venus and is familiar with 
the conceptions the names are associated with).  If an ascriber were to utter the coarse-grained Millian 
ascription (11), the audience would have to ask the ascriber follow-up questions to elicit additional 
information regarding contrasting conceptions to understand why the ancient astronomer entertained 
inconsistent beliefs (unless this information about contrasting conceptions was already clear from the 
conversational context).  A speaker who uttered (11) without following-up by providing details about 
the reasons for the ancient Greek astronomer’s inconsistent beliefs with respect to Venus would be 
flouting cooperative principles of conversation.  
There is an important and salient difference between the Hesperus/Phosphorus and the 
Kent/Superman cases on the one hand, and the Paderewski case on the other: in the former cases, two 
syntactically different co-referential names (Clark Kent/Superman; Hesperus/Phosphorus), each 
conventionally associated with a different conception, are readily available to speakers to draw 
contrasts between different conceptions because of the fact that the conceptions are conventionally 
associated with the names.  In the Paderewski case, by contrast, there is just one name.  Speakers 
cannot resort to pre-established names, each typically associated with a different conception, to draw 
any contrasts when ascribing beliefs to Peter.  The principle of Meaning Consistency admonishes us, 
ceteris paribus, to have two expressions in order to indicate differing conceptions to in order to make a 
Conception-indicating ascription with respect to Peter’s beliefs.  Arbitrarily inventing a second name 
for Paderewski from whole cloth would confuse the audience (especially since the audience, in this 
case, would not be familiar in advance with the different conceptions associated with the names by the 




Paderewski by combining ‘Paderewski’ with descriptions that key in the audience to the contrasting 
conceptions.  For example, an ascriber could utter (14) as a Conception-indicating ascription.   
 
(14)  Peter believes that Paderewski the pianist had musical talent and he disbelieves that  
Paderewski the politician has musical talent  
 
 By adding descriptions to the name ‘Paderewski,’ the partially descriptive names ‘Paderewski the 
pianist’ and ‘Paderewski the politician’ can be used in (14) to make a Conception-indicating ascription 
just as the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ were used in (13) in the Hesperus/Phosphorus case to 
make a Conception-indicating ascription.  In both (13) and in (14) different conceptions in different 
dossiers are being referred to—the use of different co-referential names alerts the audience to this.  The 
salient difference between the cases is that in (13) the speaker can resort to two different co-referential 
names conventionally associated with particular conceptions, whereas on (14) the speaker has to invent 
his own names, in order to get his audience to understand that the names are co-referential, and clue his 
audience in to the contrasting conceptions each name is associated with.   
We would not typically utter the somewhat unidiomatic (10)  
 




because the conversational principles of Attribution of Consistency and of Preference for Fine-
grained Ascriptions lead us to prefer ascriptions of the form of (14) or (15) instead. 
 
(14)  Peter believes that Paderewski the pianist had musical talent and he disbelieves that  
Paderewski the politician has musical talent  
 
(15) Peter believes of Paderewski both that had musical talent and lacked musical talent 
 




It forecloses the possibility that the speaker means that the speakers intentionally and knowingly 
believed inconsistent propositions. In most cases, and if it can be imparted without great 
circumlocution, we prefer more informative and finer-grained Conception-indicating ascriptions, such 
as (14), which provide information about conceptions that indicate to the audience to how Peter 
believes what he believes, if this can be easily done in the conversational context.  To accomplish the 
latter, we coin partially descriptive names when there are not already suitable distinct co-referential 
names in existence available to draw the contrast.   
To sum up, the TIUT answers Kripke’s puzzle as follows.  Peter both believes and disbelieves 
the singular proposition that Paderewski had musical talent.  His beliefs are inconsistent.  He is not 
irrational or illogical for entertaining these inconsistent beliefs, and we do not suggest that he is 
irrational when we ascribe to him a belief in inconsistent singular propositions.  Nevertheless, we 
generally have an aversion towards locutions that have the outward appearance of attributing 
inconsistent beliefs, and we prefer ascription sentences that give the audience information about 
conceptions because this provides a higher level of clarity, in line with Grice’s maxim of quantity.  
Hence, ascription sentences such as (10) sound unidiomatic and we tend not to utter sentences of this 
form.   
 
2.13 Conclusion  
The very existence of Frege’s puzzle is evidence that proper names do not always contribute 
merely their referents to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur.  They sometimes 
also contribute to the proposition a way of conceiving or thinking about the referent of the name. 
Common sense tells us that speakers do not utter ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ merely to say that a person 
is identical to himself.  However, there are also some sentences in which proper names seem to be 




in simple sentence and in propositional attitude ascriptions.  So proper names have these two uses: 
merely to refer, and to refer and communicate a conception.  I call the former ‘Millian’ uses and the 
latter ‘Conception-indicating’ uses. The notion that names are used in more than one way should not 
strike us as outlandish, nor should it be outlandish to think that this difference in use is semantic, and 
not merely pragmatic, in nature. After all, definite descriptions are used in two ways, either 
referentially or attributively, and many philosophers think that difference in use marks a semantic 
distinction; e.g., Devitt (2007).   The “argument from convention” (see the introduction, supra), on the 
basis of which Devitt and Reimer argue that the distinction between referential and attributive uses of 
definite descriptions is semantic in nature, applies in equal measure to the distinction between proper 
names used in a Millian or Conception-indicating way.        
From Kripke we have learned at least two important truths about proper names.  The first is that 
they are rigid designators.  The second is that there is no descriptive or conceptual element built into 
their meanings.  They are synonymous with neither ordinary definite descriptions nor rigidified 
definite descriptions.  Descriptivism is false.  Since the conceptions communicated are not part of the 
meaning of proper names, we have to explain how speakers communicate them. There are two possible 
routes. The first would be to propose that conceptions are communicated via pragmatic, rather than 
semantic, mechanisms, and that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent.  This is a route 
pursued by many modern Millians. There are many problems associated with taking that route, though 
I have not discussed them in this paper. The second route, the one taken by the TIUT, is to propose that 
the mechanism is semantic: proper names are sometimes used as indexicals that pick out the 
conception that the speaker associates with the name at the time he utters it.  The TIUT shows how this 
occurs consistent with the thesis that proper names are rigid designators.  This is where the TIUT is 
decisively superior to Descriptivism.  It is also decisively superior to Millianism because of its respect 




cognitive and truth-values of these sentences.  The TIUT does what neither Millianism nor 
Descriptivism is able to do: explain how names such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ can rigidly refer 
to the same individual and at the same time differ in content without being synonymous with definite 
descriptions.      
Once we allow that speakers can use names just to refer, we have to deal with the problem of 
rational inconsistent belief. Rational speakers may entertain inconsistent beliefs. Lois Lane 
inconsistently believes that Kent-Super can and cannot fly.   Peter both believes and disbelieves that 
Paderewski had musical talent.  Unless we are willing to say that these speakers are irrational, which 
we obviously should not, we have to explain their inconsistency as arising out of ignorance of some 
fact or facts. But what are these speakers ignorant of?  The TIUT and guise Millianism take a 
somewhat similar approach here and posit that speakers do not have full cognitive access to the 
propositions they assert and believe.  Content is partially externalist. Some Millians say that speakers 
do grasp the propositions the express/believe directly, but only via a propositional guise that may hide 
part of the content of those propositions. Problematically, all accounts of propositional guises are 
obscure and lacking in the details.  The TIUT’s approach is similar to that of the guise Millians, but it 
offers a specific proposal: names are indexicals with a character meaning as well as content. Character 
is the guise behind which content hides.  Speakers are inconsistent because they understand the 
character of the propositions they express and believe, but not the content (or at least, not the full 
content).    
In the introduction, I claimed that to solve Frege’s puzzle, we needed a theory of proper names 







1.   Proper names are rigid designators [From Kripke’s modal argument].65 
2.  Proper names do not have descriptive meanings [From Kripke’s semantic and epistemic 
arguments]. 
  
3.    Identity sentences like (1)-(2) express different propositions with the same modal profile 
[That they have the same modal profile follows from the modal argument; that they 
express different propositions follows from intuitions brought to light by Frege’s puzzle 
about identity sentences].  
  
4.    Propositional attitude ascriptions like (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) express different propositions 
differing in truth-value [From intuitions brought to light by Frege’s puzzle about 
propositional attitude ascriptions]. 
  
5.   Sometimes proper names are used merely to refer, contributing only their referents to 
the propositions expressed. 
  
6.  Sometimes proper names are used both to refer and to convey conceptions. They 
contribute something other than merely their referents to the propositions expressed. 
 
 
I have shown that the TIUT respects all of these theses. It also offers an answer to the problem of 
rational inconsistent belief and Kripke’s puzzle.  Hence, the TIUT constitutes a very attractive theory 
of proper names.   
 The TIUT is also attractive because it is consistent with how one might go about describing 
Lois Lane’s ignorance of Clark Kent’s identity with Superman in a common sense, pre-theoretical 
way.   Lois Lane fails to realize that there are two sets of information in her mind that are in fact about 
the same person, Kent-Super. So let us call each of those sets of information a “dossier.”  Let us say 
that each dossier “is about” Kent-Super in virtue of some property and call this property 
“subjecthood.”  Lois’ two dossiers have the same subjecthood, so they are about the same person.  
Lois’ dossiers contain different representations: one represents its subject as a mild-mannered reporter, 
the other as a superhero. Let us call these representations “conceptions.”  Lois can introspect and see 
these conceptions clearly. She can see that the conceptions in the dossiers represent their subjects in 
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 I leave open the possibility that there may be some uses of proper names that are not rigid. But I presuppose that all of 




very different ways, and she believes that they are about different individuals.  Although both dossiers 
have the same subjecthood, Lois cannot introspect, no matter how hard she reflects upon the matter, 
and determine that the dossiers have the same subjecthood.  This is because the subjecthood is at least 
in part a relational property, inhering in facts external to Lois’ mind.  In much the same way, you could 
not look at a photo of Obama in which he more closely resembled Malcolm X and tell, just by the way 
the photo looks, that this is a photo of Obama and not Malcolm X.  What makes the photo a photo of 
Obama is relational and causal, and therefore something not evident within the four corners of the 
photo.  One cannot see the history of the photo in the image.  Likewise, the property of dossier 
subjecthood is such that Lois does not have cognitive access to it.  Lois cannot find out that the 
dossiers are about the same person just by armchair reflection.  She would have to look at these extra-
mental facts to find out that these dossiers are about the same individual.   
When those in the know about the identity want to describe Lois’ epistemic state, they utter 
‘Lois does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman.’ On the TIUT, this ascription sentence means 
exactly what the above story relates about Lois.  The sentence means that Lois has one dossier with 
which she associates the name ‘Clark Kent’ and another with which she associates the name 
‘Superman,’ and she does not realize these dossiers are about the same individual.  When we want to 
say, in general, what anyone who suffers from the sort of confusion that Lois does, i.e., they fail to 
realize that Clark Kent is Superman, we say that, in general, failing to realize that Clark Kent is 
Superman means not realizing that one type of dossier has the same subject as another type of dossier. 
Specifically, not knowing that Clark Kent is Superman means not knowing that that the type of dossier 
that is about Kent-Super and represents him in one way—a Clark Kent-y way—is about the same 
person as a different type of dossier that represents him in a different way—a Superman-y way. In 
order to specify these types of dossiers, ascribers entertain dossiers token of these types and then make 




their dossier tokens instantiate to content as per the Conception-indicating character.   
Propositional attitude ascriptions involve the ascriber imagining the way that the ascribee views 
the world and creating within his own mind a temporary model of the ascribee’s worldview. The 
ascriber forms a dossier structure that mimics and mirrors that of the ascribee. Then the ascriber is able 
to speak about his own dossier tokens as if they were those of the ascribee.  He may do so by relying 
on the fact that, if he has understood the ascribee’s cognitive state well enough, his own dossier tokens 
are of the same type as those of the ascribee.  His own tokens and Lois’ (or anyone’s who confused 
about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman) all belong to the same type, and therefore, the ascriber 
can point to his tokens as instating that type and say that all those who do not realize the identity fail to 
realize that these dossier types (the one’s his own tokens instantiate) are individuated by the same 
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